

THE MOTLEY MAP: THE GAME-CHANGING EFFECT OF ETHNOGRAPHIC CARTOGRAPHY ON THE ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1914–16

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Romania's negotiations to enter the First World War were a long and tortuous journey. A key issue in the negotiations was the list of Romanian territorial demands. The present article, based on newly published telegrams between Constantin Diamandy and Ion I.C. Brătianu as well as the discovery of some of the maps used in the negotiations analyses these territorial demands. In particular, both sides claimed to justify their opposing positions on the same ethnographic principle. The article argues that the two sides had very different understanding of the ethnographic principle. A key aspect in the negotiations was the use of ethnographic maps, which changed the understanding of the ethnographic principle. The maps were fundamental in the negotiations and shaped the demands and the result of the negotiations.

A key concept in the negotiations was that of territories inhabited by Romanians, in effect a notion of the ideal Romanian state based on history as well as ethnography. This concept in places conflicted with the ethnographic principle. The negotiations showed how Romanian diplomacy tried to merge the two principles and adapt them to the demands of the Russian side.

The article also analyses the territorial claims of Ion I.C. Brătianu in light of Romanian ethnographic cartography and the Romanian image of the ideal Romanian state. It argues that Ion I.C. Brătianu was in fact only demanding what most Romanian intellectual and political elites would consider to be Romanian territory and it discusses the role ethnography had in these ideal claims.

Keywords: Romanian ethnographic cartography, territories inhabited by Romanians, Romania's negotiations to enter the First World War, Constantin Diamandy, Ion I.C. Brătianu, Greater Romania.

In 1878 Romania was obliged, against its will, to accept the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin relating to its own territory. The same situation recurred in 1919 when Romania was treated as a minor power in regard to its Western border. In 1940 as well as in 1947 Romania was again forced to accept borders imposed by others. The only time in modern history when Romania gained acceptance on an equal footing with a Great Power was during the direct negotiations conducted between 1914–16 with Russia regarding its entry into the war. After many meetings with the Russian Foreign Ministry in Petrograd the talks ended with assurances that almost all of Romania's demands would be met. And yet, even before the negotiations ended, there were signs that the negotiations were not a success. Why

did they last so long and what went wrong? What really happened in Tsarskoye Selo?¹

This article re-examines Romania's negotiations to enter the First World War.² It is not, however, a complete history of these negotiations. It will leave aside the other clauses or the intricacies of diplomatic exchanges and will instead focus on the ethnographic principle as it was used at the core of the negotiations. We are very fortunate to have, for these negotiations, a series of telegrams exchanged between Ion I.C. Brătianu, Sergei Sazonov and their representatives with the other side, respectively. Taking as a basis the telegrams and the ethnographic maps used in the negotiations, the article explores the various ways in which both sides used and interpreted ethnographic maps. These written and graphic documents enable us to understand the principles underlying the negotiations, in particular the ethnographic principle and the way it was supposed to be applied in defining the frontiers.

For the history of the Romanian-Russian negotiations these documents provide a glimpse behind the scenes, an insight into the mindset of the main diplomatic players. They enable us to look beyond the text of the treaties into the thinking and contradictions of each side. Based on these insights, we argue that from the start both sides sought the same outcome: a Romanian state based on the ethnographic principle. Throughout the two years of negotiations they did not fundamentally change their position. Yet the two sides had two very different views of what the ethnographic principle should mean for Romania. Because of this, the negotiations were very long and were, in the end, a partial failure.

THE BACKGROUND

The start of the war took Romanian leaders by surprise. Romania had a secret alliance with the Triple Alliance dating from 1883, but Romania's relations with

¹ This article would not have been possible without the generous help of many individuals. Above all I owe mountains of gratitude to the professionals who helped me find, study and scan the maps and documents. From the National Archives of Romania I am particularly indebted to Codruța Mihailovici, Claudiu-Victor Turcitu, and Laura Dumitru. I particularly thank Mariana Radu from the Library of the Romanian Academy and Stelian Obiziuc from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last but not least I am deeply indebted to Marian Coman and Robert Born, who edited this thematic section of the *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, for their infinite patience and very useful comments and suggestions.

² There is an extensive bibliography on these negotiations. The main titles in chronological order: C. Nuțu, *România în anii neutralității, 1914–1916*, București, 1972; A. Iordache, *Reorientarea politică a României și neutralitatea armată, 1914–1916*, București, 1998; V. Guzun, (ed.), *Intrarea României în Primul Război Mondial. Negocierile diplomatice în documente din arhivele ruse, 1914–1916*, Cluj-Napoca, 2016. See also Daniel Cain's introduction to the two volumes of Diamandy's correspondence published so far, E. Mușat and L. Dumitru (eds.), *Constantin Diamandi, ministru al României la Petrograd, Vol. I. Memorii, corespondență diplomatică 1914–1915*, București, 2020 (henceforth *Diamandy ANR I*); Idem, *Constantin Diamandi, ministru al României la Petrograd, Vol. II. Corespondență diplomatică 1915–1916*, București, 2021 (henceforth *Diamandy ANR II*).

these powers and especially with Austro-Hungary had cooled down considerably in previous years. According to the post-war memoirs of the general Radu Rossetti, for a few days Brătianu contemplated declaring war on Russia. If this was the case, he quickly changed course and settled on neutrality.³ In the crown council of July 21st, 1914, Brătianu argued for neutrality and, according to some sources, that the sufferings of Romanians in Transylvania were Romania's national interest.⁴ Brătianu's point of view settled the issue.⁵ Shortly after the council Brătianu would receive the first telegrams from the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov. This was the start of negotiations that would last for more than two years.

The negotiations were conducted between the Russian Foreign Minister and the Romanian minister-president residing in Petrograd and Bucharest respectively. They raised arguments, proposed and counter proposed through their representatives in each other's capital to whom they sent numerous telegrams which constitute the bulk of our primary sources.⁶ Constantin Diamandy⁷ was the Romanian legate in Petrograd and Stanislav Alfonsovici Poklevski-Koziell (from now on Poklevsky)⁸ was the Russian equivalent in Bucharest.

³ R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914–1919)*, București, 1997, p. 50. For the political atmosphere of those days see D. Cain, "Introducere", in *Diamandy ANR I*, p. 7–17.

⁴ The main witness accounts of the 1914 and 1916 crown councils have been gathered in I. Mamina, *Consiliu de Coroană*, București, 1997, p. 27–87. Brătianu's argument, that Romania's national interests were connected with the suffering of Transylvanian Romanians, is recorded by Costinescu and I.G. Duca, see Mamina, *Consiliu...*, p. 38 and 45.

⁵ King Carol I and some of the political leaders were leaning towards declaring war on Russia. Brătianu postponed the news of Italy's neutrality until the council to help influence the King and the opposition. See Mamina, *Consiliu...*, p. 27–52.

⁶ Many of these telegrams have been published in several volumes. The complete list of documents used in this article is listed in the Annex below. A few unpublished documents are also used in this article, from the archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest. Other documents will no doubt appear in the future as well.

⁷ Constantin Diamandy (sometimes spelled Diamandi) was one of Brătianu's closest political advisors. On his life see D. Cain, "Introducere" 2020, p. 12–17. Although he published little during his lifetime, he left a large number of documents to the Romanian National Archives. The two volumes of telegrams from Diamandy to Brătianu and vice-versa published by Elena Mușat and Laura Dumitru of the Romanian National Archives constitute the most important source for the present article: *Diamandy ANR I* and *Diamandy ANR II*. Diamandy himself published a series of articles on these negotiations: Ct. Diamandy, "La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental. I. Un nouvel «homme malade» en Europe", in *Revue des deux mondes* LVII, 1927, 4 (15 decembre), p. 781–204; Idem, "La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental, II. L'entrevue de Constantza", in *Revue des Deux Mondes* LVIII, 1928, 1 (1 janvier), p. 129–142; Idem, "La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental. III. La tragédie d'une conscience royale" in *Revue des Deux Mondes* LIX, 1929, 4 (15 novembre), p. 794–820; Idem, "La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental, IV. Ma mission en Russie. Octobre 1914 – Mai 1915", in *Revue des Deux Mondes* LX, 1930, 2 (15 novembre), p. 421–432. These articles, which chronologically cover the period until May 1915 amount to a combination of memoirs and essays on various diplomatic topics. Several versions of the events of the following weeks are preserved in his archives. Some are used in the present articles. One has already been published: Ct. Diamandy, "Cum s-a creat harta României Mari" in D. Preda, Șt. Pâslaru, M. Georgescu, M. C. Stănescu (eds.), *România în timpul primului război mondial. Mărturii documentare, vol. 1: 1914–1916*, București, 1996, p. 147–176.

⁸ On Poklevsky's career see S. Sucevică, "A Russian Diplomat in Bucharest: S. A. Poklevski-Koziell and the 'Bessarabian Cause', 1919–1920", *Arhivele Totalitarismului XXII*, 2014, 1–2, p. 10–30.

THE TELEGRAMS AND MAPS AS HISTORICAL SOURCES

Diplomatic negotiations generally result in documents binding for both sides. Often these negotiations are prepared by published arguments, historical, ethnographic, economic or military which develop one's arguments. Yet these documents show already prepared arguments. Rarely however can we glimpse into the kitchen of these preparations to understand the nascent arguments. In the case of the Romanian-Russian negotiations, we know a great deal more and this is largely due to a wealth of telegrams, sometimes a few each day, written on the spur of the moment with a plethora of details and comments on the ongoing negotiations. The telegrams allow us a direct window into the thinking of each side, which would otherwise be lost. Thanks to them we have a number of succeeding drafts of the neutrality and later alliance agreements, together with comments, reports of conversations and suggestions on continuing the negotiations. We are also very fortunate to see how the players used and related to maps and overall to understand the role maps played in the negotiations. There were two types of maps used in the negotiations. Some were made specifically to provide clarifications and arguments. At other times pre-existing maps were used as authorities.

Most of the telegrams are messages exchanged between Diamandy and Brătianu and so they largely document the Romanian perspective to the negotiations. There are some telegrams between Poklevsky and Sazonov which help uncover the Russian perspective. Sazonov himself, in his memoirs did not dwell on the negotiations. An article written in 1930 by Albert Pingaud in 1930 however focuses on Sazonov's perspective. In his narrative of the negotiations, Pingaud often includes Sazonov's personal reactions or opinions, which the French author could have only obtained from the Russian Foreign Minister himself. Sazonov spent the last years of his life in France and may have shared his recollections with Pingaud.⁹ Further documents from Russian archives would offer a much more balanced view, but those available so far concord with the Romanian ones.

THE NARRATIVE

Negotiations started from the beginning of the war. Although Sazonov was hoping at first that Romania would join the war as soon as possible, he realized that the sympathies of the Romanian king, Carol I, as well as the pro-German sentiments of a good part of the political elite would preclude such an option. The Russian Foreign Minister had to settle for a convention for neutrality and this would be eventually signed in October 1914.

⁹ A. Pingaud, "Études Diplomatiques: L'Entente et la Roumanie. 3 Mai – 22 Aout 1915", *Revue des Deux Mondes* LVII, 1930, 1 (1er mai), p. 144–161. The article includes a map showing Pingaud's or perhaps Sazonov's interpretation of the two opposing sides (p. 148). Not all aspects raised by Pingaud appear in the telegrams between Diamandy and Brătianu, yet the key concepts are present.

A first batch of telegrams documents these lively negotiations. From the start, the convention was to include a clause in which Romania's territorial demands were described as a principle, or as it would later be called, a pact (no. 65).¹⁰ This principle, in the form in which it was finally signed, spoke of all provinces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy inhabited by Romanians (*les provinces austro-hongroises dont la population est roumaine*, no. 16). A map was supposed to be annexed, which turned the principle into actual territory. The convention was signed in hurry and the map was not ready, so it was decided to add the map at a later date. (nos. 1, 2, 3, 12).

There was also another clause, concerning Bukovina. This clause stated that :

Pour Bucovine principe majorité de la population servira de base à la délimitation des territoires à annexer soit par Russie soit par la Roumanie. Cette délimitation sera effectuée à la suite études spéciales sur les lieux (no. 12).

This clause apparently repeated the first, general one, identifying Romanian claims as those inhabited by Romanians, yet was only limited to one province. In fact the two clauses are quite different and they constitute, as we shall see, the key divergence in the negotiations.

The border map was supposed to be annexed to the text of the convention, but in the end the text was signed without the map. This caused some confusion as to the real border. King Carol I, commenting on an early draft of the convention called it imprecise. The king also referred to a 'vague reference' to Bukovina.¹¹

After the signing of the neutrality convention, Diamandy returned to Romania in the winter of 1914. The death of Carol I, the ascension of a new Romanian king, Ferdinand, well disposed towards the Entente, changed the political situation in Romania. Brătianu was also fearful that were Romania not to enter the war, it would not receive its full territorial demands even after the signing of the October convention. According to Sazonov, the convention "would only allow Romania to occupy Transylvania and southern Bukovina without our help" but did not mean that Romania would automatically receive those territories without fighting.¹²

It was also becoming clear to both parts that the text of the neutrality convention gave neither party what they wanted. As we shall show below, the text was interpreted by both parties in very different ways. Brătianu decided to start negotiations for an alliance treaty. In the spring of 1915 Diamandy returned to Petrograd with a map. This map was intended by the Romanian side to fulfil the terms of the October convention. The map should be stored in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Until now it has not been found, but as we can piece

¹⁰ From here on all references to documents refer to the annex published at the end of the article.

¹¹ Al. Marghiloman, *Note politique*, ed. Stelian Neagoe, București, 1993, vol. I, p. 179–180. See also below, n. 28.

¹² Quoted by V.N. Vinogradov, "Romania in the First World War: The Years of Neutrality, 1914–1916", *The International History Review* 14, (1992), 3, p. 455 and n. 10.

together from the correspondence it presented Romanian demands in the shape of a detailed border line (no. 20). In one of his memoirs, the Romanian minister describes this map as “on a large scale, on which our demands were marked with a blue line” (no. 29c). It was probably a large-scale map, probably a topographic one on which the demanded border was drawn. It was created by a certain Major Sârbu of the Cartographic service of the Army (no. 19). Although we do not have that map we can reconstruct the border from several telegrams which spell out the border in words (no. 20). Generally speaking, it is probably similar to the border found in the 1916 alliance treaty, as it was published in 1919 (**Fig. 1a**).

Revealing of the atmosphere reigning in Bucharest, after Diamandy arrived in Russia, Brătianu telegraphed several times with corrections to the border map (nos. 20, 25, 26). Diamandy seems to have been confused by what exactly to demand. He asked for a new map and in the meantime decided not to show Sazonov the map he had brought from Bucharest (nos. 21 and 29a–c). A new map was sent by mail but would not arrive in time for the crucial meeting on the territorial demands which took place on May 3rd 1915.

THE MEETING BETWEEN SAZONOV AND DIAMANDY ON MAY 3rd 1915

Having returned to Petrograd, Diamandy had a crucial meeting with Sazonov on May 3rd. The resumé of the meeting as presented by Pingaud (and perhaps based on Sazonov’s recollections) describes the meeting as a formal one in which the Diamandy presented orally the message he had been asked to deliver.¹³

We also have, for this meeting, Diamandy’s later recollections (texts nos. 29a–c). These are accounts Diamandy wrote at various points after the war and which are preserved in several manuscripts. One text was originally written in Romanian (no. 29a). Perhaps Diamandy meant to publish one himself and was preparing several versions.¹⁴ In the end he did not, and we do not have any internal clue as to which version of the texts was seen by Diamandy as more accurate.

In all drafts the meeting of May 3rd is given a particular importance. At this meeting Diamandy, who had decided not to show his own map, was surprised that Sazonov presented his own map. All versions of Diamandy’s memoirs record that this was a small-scale ethnographic map in which the Slavic element was green and

¹³ Pingaud, *Études Diplomatiques...*, p. 147.

¹⁴ In the end the text Diamandy published his own memoirs of the negotiations, in four episodes, between 1927 and 1930. The last episode ended right before this meeting and dealt with Italy’s entry in the war (C. Diamandy, “La Grande Guerre vue du versant oriental. Ma mission en Russie II, octobre 1914 – mai 1915”, *Revue des deux Mondes* LX, 1930, 2 (15 novembre), p. 421–432). In one of the versions of the May 3rd meeting Sazonov states: ‘now that Italy entered the war, Romania’s price has dropped’, it is probable that the various versions of the May the 3rd meeting are drafts which were meant to become episode V of Diamandy’s diplomatic memoirs.

that it was a few decades old, perhaps from 1878. In one text the map is described as coming from an Atlas. Diamandy stresses his indignation at the large amount of green on the map (which apparently made him see red):

Mr. Sazonov ... presented me with a map which, curious detail, dated from 1875 and in which the nationalities between the Tisza and the Pruth, that is Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina, exactly the *territories* that had to be negotiated between us, were marked in colours and the dominant colour, at first sight, was green representing the Slavic element...I couldn't stop myself telling Mr. Sazonov: the map has a horrible appearance through the green colour and allow me to bring forth a more modern map than this one. (no. 29a)

I had a great surprise seeing the one he was showing me. For whatever reason, Mr. Sazonov used, on this occasion, an old atlas which dated from 1878 and in which most of Bukovina and more than 3/4th of the Banat were coloured in green, the colour of Slavic populations. ... I sent mr. Sazonov a map at the same time correct and without Slavic hachures... (no. 29b)

Sazonov presented me with a minuscule map from an atlas published in 1859 and where the green colour, which marked the Slavic element in Bukovina, Maramuresh and the Banat were abundant and, as I told him, made the map so motley as to make it difficult for the eye... (no. 29c)

Diamandy wrote these accounts over a decade after the meeting so could we trust his recollections as true or were they retouched, after the fact? There are signs that his reaction was genuine. His description of the map shows that he did not try to research it after the war. He did not remember the author and had doubts about the year of publication. He remembered vividly the predominant green colour and the small size of the map. Overall, the Romanian legate was full of shock and surprise. He did not expect an ethnographic map to be used in the negotiations. He seems to have understood, while studying the map, that patches of colour provided an excellent argument for border delimitations and that these did not correspond to his demands. The ethnographic map had a strong impact on the negotiations.

This impact was visible in his ongoing correspondence with Brătianu. Ethnographic maps do not appear in the telegrams before this meeting, but they become a regular issue afterwards (starting with no. 46). Diamandy started demanding ethnographic maps 'favourable to our claims'. We will examine this change further on.

THE RUSSIAN ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP

Diamandy had another meeting with Sazonov on May 12th, in which the Banat and Bukovina were again discussed. Sazonov again produced an ethnographic map (nos. 47 and 48), described as bearing the date of 1878. There is no reason to believe that Sazonov used another map. In both meetings he probably used the same one so the most probable date is 1878.

- So what clues did Diamandy give to help us understand what map Sazonov used?
- **Date:** 1859, 1875 or 1878. The latter appearing in a telegram written shortly after the meetings, so the stronger one.
 - **Colour:** it was a coloured map in which each ethnic group is allocated one colour. Slavic colour is green. Both Serbs and Ruthenians seem to have shared the colour green.
 - **Size:** it was small and came from an atlas.
 - **Origin:** it was “an official Hungarian map” (no. 47), based on the Austro-Hungarian census.

Based on these clues we could not precisely identify the map. Diamandy did not provide the author and the biggest difficulty is the date of the map, 1878. No official Austro-Hungarian ethnographic maps were produced in this year. Yet the year could refer to the redrawing of borders in the Berlin Congress of 1878, the most recent date Romania’s borders had been changed, not to the actual year of the map. Leaving the authorship and date aside, the other details about the map are coherent with each other. Diamandy states that the map was based on official statistics. This means that the map most certainly came from German or Austro-Hungary. Many ethnographic maps from these countries presented the Slavs in Green.

The most useful details given by Diamandy is that of size. The map was of small size and came from an atlas. These maps were numerous but fortunately for us very similar. The most popular maps used in Atlases in the period, be they Meyer’s *Lexikon*, Freytags, Schultzer’s or other atlases had ethnographic maps of the Austro-Hungarian lands which were very similar to each other. They followed the same principle of ethnographic representation, that is one colour to identify the majority population, ignoring minorities. They were popularization maps not created directly from statistics but from redrawing a source, authoritative map. This source was Kiepert’s 1869 (updated in 1882) map. Kiepert’s map strictly followed the official data, the Austro-Hungarian census. It had had been used in negotiations in Berlin in 1878 and was by far regarded as the most authoritative ethnographic map of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at the end of the century¹⁵. “Even today must one use Kiepert’s map”,¹⁶ lamented Aurel Popovici in his 1906 famous project of the United States of Greater Austria. Many cartographers were, at the turn of the twentieth-century, highly critical of Kiepert’s mono-colour system of representation and were developing more advanced methods. The map Sazonov used however, dating from the 1870s was probably based on Kiepert’s system.

We can reconstruct Sazonov’s map using Kiepert’s 1882 ethnographic map of the Danube lands.¹⁷ This was an updated version of his 1869 map, with the new

¹⁵ A case in point was that of Romanian geographers in this period. See *Analele Academiei Române, S. II, XXXIII, 1910–1911, Partea Administrativă și Dezbaterile*, p. 224.

¹⁶ A. C. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Großösterreich. Politische Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und staatsrechtlichen Krisen in Osterreich – Ungarn*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 287.

¹⁷ H. Kiepert, *Völker- und Sprachen-Karte von Österreich und den Unter-Donau-Ländern*, Berlin, 1882. URL: <https://goobi-viewer.univie.ac.at/viewer/fullscreen/AC03904675/1/>. Last accessed: 25.04.2022.

borders drawn after the congress of Berlin in 1878. We can be confident that the map Sazonov used was similar to this one, albeit on a smaller scale. On Kiepert's map (**Fig. 2a**) we can see compact green areas in the very areas under discussion: the North and West of Bukovina (**Fig. 2b**) as well as the South-West of the Banat (**Fig. 2c**).

THE IMPACT OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP

After early May 1915 meetings with Sazonov, Diamandy urgently telegraphed Brătianu to ask for ethnographic maps “advantageous to the Romanian side” (no. 47) as well as other ethnographic bibliography and statistics to support his claims. Two days later Brătianu sent a memorandum on the Banat drafted by Nicolae Iorga, which he described as being “written in haste” (no. 49). Brătianu warned that the memorandum should not be quoted directly, perhaps fearful that it was, in part, inexact (no. 49). In the Diamandy files of the Romanian archives there is an unsigned, handwritten memorandum on the Banat which could well be that of Iorga (no. 51). The memorandum speaks, as was the norm in Romanian historiography, of Romanian historical rights on the Banat, based on the Dacian past, on the testimony of the Byzantine historian and rhetorician Priscus and on the testimony of the Italian scholar and natural scientist Francesco Grisellini (from 1774). The memorandum argued that if there are Serbs in the Banat it is because of immigration after the defeat of Kosovo Polje (1389) and of course to the vicissitudes of Romanian history. This type of argumentation was characteristic of argumentations of many Romanian intellectuals during the war and of the Romanian delegation at the Peace Congress of 1919.

THE ROMANIAN DELEGATION PRESENTS ITS OWN ETHNOGRAPHIC MAPS

Besides the memorandum, Brătianu sent Diamandy Romanian-made ethnographic maps, as described in a telegram dated May 17th (no. 50). There Brătianu spoke of a map of Banat, one of the areas under discussion. As it had happened before, as soon as the map was sent, it was discovered that changes were needed. In the same telegram in which the sending of the map was announced, Brătianu asked Diamandy to modify it by suppressing the ethnic data on the margins.

Until now the Romanian ethnographic map of the Banat has not been found.¹⁸ By a fortuitous circumstance a manuscript map preserved in the collection of the Library of the Romanian Academy, called *an Ethnographic Sketch of the Lands of*

¹⁸ In the telegram (no. 50) Brătianu asks Diamandy not to use the data on the sides of the map. Perhaps this lack of trust means that Diamandy destroyed it.

Hungary inhabited by Romanians, dated to 1915 bears a hand-written note: ‘Map which was used as a base for the diplomatic negotiations in the spring of 1915’¹⁹ (from now on called *General Sketch*).

This map is focused on the lands of the crown of Hungary, so it does not cover Bukovina, but it does cover the Banat. Yet another manuscript map, covering only Bukovina, preserved in at least two copies bearing a similar title and date to the *General Sketch*.²⁰ It is called an *Ethnographic Sketch of the Lands of Bukovina inhabited by Romanians* (from now on called the *Bukovina Sketch*). Not only does the title use the same wording as the *General Sketch*, but the fonts and the legend show remarkable similarities. There are, to my knowledge, no other Romanian made ethnographic maps that present these similarities. It is very probable that the *Bukovina Sketch* was also used in the negotiations.

Both maps prominently display administrative divisions, such as counties, which as we shall see serve a key role in Romania’s claims. Although Diamandy complained at length about the green colour of the Slavic hachures, the Romanian ethnographic maps are also full of shades of green, this time representing Romanians.

Both maps use a more complex method of ethnic representation than Kiepert’s map. Hachures are used to display minorities and the width of this hachure is proportional to the strength of the minority. The general map has 20%, 30% and 50% divisions while the Bukovina one 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 35% and 40%. The traditional, mono-colour system of representing ethnographic maps, such as the one used by Kiepert, was slowly being challenged in the early years of the twentieth-century. The main disadvantage of the mono-colour system was the absence of minorities. There was also no differentiation between urban and rural areas. Even though the majority of Eastern Europe still lived in villages, urban population was increasing.

THE GRAPHIC SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION

In the first decades of the twentieth-century there was no generally agreed principle on the principles of ethnographic representation. There was a general dissatisfaction with the mono-colour system, in particular in regards to minorities and urban areas. In the mono-colour system minorities were completely ignored while cities were dwarfed by their immediate surrounding countryside. When the population of the city was different from that of the surrounding villages it would not be distinguishable at all on the map. There was no agreement as to how to improve it. Hachures, shades or symbols were all tried, but no system was perfect.

A good example of one of the most complex systems attempted was the 1915 map of Paul Langhans (**Fig. 5a**). The map provided a wealth of details. Yet

¹⁹ BAR, Cabinetul de Stampe, Muzică, Hărți, D.XVII.55.

²⁰ The one presented here is preserved in the map collection of the University of Cluj (BCU Cluj, Catalog hărți și atlase, 62/5). Another copy is preserved at the Romanian Academy, BAR, Cabinetul de Stampe, Muzică, Hărți, C.XLI.108.

Bukovina was a small province and so Langhans produced a map on a very large scale (1:200.000). If the map needed to cover a larger area and so the scale was smaller, some detail would inevitably be lost. We can observe this on another Langhans map published in the same year, covering all Romanian population within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the scale of 1:1.500.000. That map still provides a lot of details for Bukovina but the urban population has been sacrificed (**Fig. 5c**). Another particularity of Bukovina was that the population was clearly divided with Romanians occupying the South and East and Ruthenians occupying the North and West. This situation did not repeat everywhere. In the Banat, the same map of Langhans did not allow a clear division between Romanians and Serbs (**Fig. 5d**).

The fundamental reality of ethnographic cartography was that the more complex the system, the better was the level of accuracy. However, the map became clogged and difficult to read. Simpler systems offered the advantage of clarity yet they sacrificed accuracy. A successful cartographer should try to reach a good balance, always keeping in mind the purpose of the map.²¹

The *Bukovina Sketch* does present a more complex method of representation than the mono-colour one used by Kiepert. It falls short of a full representation of minorities, but this could be explained by the need to use the map to draw clear borders. The system of representation chosen by the Romanian cartographer and in particular the absence of other ethnic groups besides Romanians and Ruthenians shows that he did indeed have negotiations in mind.

There is an important difference between the *General* and *Bukovina Sketches*. In Bukovina only Ruthenians and Romanians are considered. Other ethnic groups, such as Hungarians, Polish, Germans or Jews are ignored. In Bukovina this was a key issue, in particular in and around the capital Czernowitz.

The general map considers other minorities, in particular German and Hungarian. Yet here the minorities did not matter so much. The most important contentious point was with the Serbs who did not occupy any major urban centres on the borders of the regions Romanian claimed, with the possible exception of Timișoara/ Temesvár. Timișoara does not appear directly in the negotiations.

To understand what these choices meant we can study in more detail the case of the capital of Bukovina, Czernowitz. The city comprised roughly 10% of the population of the province (80.000 out of 800.000), Czernowitz fell on the rift between Ruthenian population in the North and Romanian population in the South. In the mono-colour system (**Fig. 2c**) the rift was clearly visible and it creates the impression that the city is inhabited by either Romanians or Ruthenians, or by a mixture of both. Yet these two nationalities made up only about 33% of the city population in 1910, the other inhabitants numbering Jews (more than 33%), Germans or Poles.²² In the mono-colour system it would be completely

²¹ This is the argument of E. de Martonne, "Essai de carte ethnographique des pays roumains", *Annales de Géographie* 29, 1920, 158 (15 mars), p. 87–88.

²² The exact numbers are: Romanian 13.440; Ruthenian 15.253; Jewish 28.613; German 12.747; Polish 14.893; Other 1.182. From C. Turliuc, M. Șt. Ceaușu, D. Vitcu, eds., *Izvoare statistice privind mutațiile demografice la est de Carpați în secolele XX–XXI*, Iași, 2011, p. 166–171.

indistinguishable from the surrounding countryside (**Fig. 2c**). In Langhans' map of Bukovina (**Fig. 5b**) the city is clearly distinguishable from the surrounding countryside. In Langhans' general map of the Romanian population Czernowitz fell within a patch of Ruthenian population.

The maps drawn by the Romanian delegation for the negotiations used a medium level of complexity for the period. The level of detail and of clarity was overall no better or worse than many other maps for the purpose of drawing borders.

ACCURACY

Are the Romanian ethnographic maps accurate? The question of accuracy is always on someone's mind when studying an ethnographic map. It is however a very difficult question to answer, especially when our data is incomplete.

The reference to statistics in one of the telegrams (no. 50) is in our view important. Maps are only graphic representations of statistical data. Cartographers with good reputations in that period published or referenced the statistical source of their maps. Many, such as Kiepert or Langhans used the official Austro-Hungarian census data. De Martonne in 1919 slightly modified the census data but carefully described his alterations²³. The maps we discussed above may have been accompanied by data which are now lost. Without the data we cannot see how these cartographers turned statistical numbers into patches of colour.

In the absence of the statistical data on which the maps were drawn, the only way of providing an answer to the question of accuracy is by comparative analysis with other contemporaneous maps.

We can overall note that the *Bukovina Sketch* (**Fig. 4a**) shows more Romanian population in areas where the Langhans map of Bukovina does not (**Fig. 5a**), but that area is mountainous and hardly populated. When the population is limited to a few villages it is difficult to know exactly how much colour each village occupies.

However, if we study the map in comparison with the Langhans (**Fig. 5a**) and the Kiepert (**Fig. 2c**) maps, we can notice a fundamental difference. In both German maps the two dominant colours of the Romanian and Ruthenian populations is overall equal. This seems overall as a balanced result given that the two groups of population were roughly equal. In the *Bukovina Sketch*, the Romanian colour occupies visibly more territory than the Ruthenian one.²⁴

The *General Sketch* (**Fig. 3a**) however presents a rather picture. It shows a strong Romanian presence in the areas to the West of Arad-Oradea-Satu Mare line.

²³ E. de Martonne, "Essai de carte ethnographique ...", p. 81–98.

²⁴ How much colour should be attributed to each ethnic group is a difficult question for ethnographic cartographers. If one studies a certain locality, its colour should be based on the ethnicity of the place. What should one do when there is a strong disparity in the population size of adjacent localities? A good example is the city of Czernowitz, surrounded by villages of Romanians and Ruthenians. In many maps (such as *the Bukovina Sketch*) the importance of the city tends to be lost if surrounded by villages of different ethnic groups.

This presence is not attested by any other map of the period.²⁵ Whatever the data behind the map would have been and no matter the interpretation, it would be difficult to defend a cartographic solution not adopted by any other cartographer.

To complete the analysis of the maps we need first to study the language and concepts used in the negotiations.

THE PAINFUL WAY TOWARDS A COMPROMISE

We unfortunately do not know what impression Romanian ethnographic maps had on Sazonov. There is no hint in the telegrams preserved so far that the Romanian ethnographic maps were even presented to the Russian Foreign Minister. We do know that after the May meetings Sazonov will maintain that Romanian claims do not respect the ethnographic principle, even though they invoke it (nos. 30, 37, 38, 54, 65).

As both sides seemed entrenched in their positions, a compromise solution was proposed by one of Brătianu's closest collaborators and Finance Minister, Emil Costinescu. We first hear of it in Poklewsky's telegram dated April 19th (no. 28). Diamandy also mentions it (no. 59) so it seems that everyone was aware of it. This solution gave Romania the capital of Czernowitz and most of the line of the Pruth which Brătianu had demanded. It however gave Russia the West part of the Bukovina, facing Galicia.

The so called Costinescu line seems to have originally been proposed by Iancu Flondor in a memorandum to Brătianu dated February 1915 (no. 17). Flondor was a native of Bukovina and politically active in supporting Romania's claims.²⁶ His memorandum was extremely well prepared, focusing on the historical aspect of the negotiations, but also on the ethnographical and geographical ones. Flondor argued that the Ruthenian population was the result of immigration, of Ruthenization and of the Austrian policy of asking the inhabitants what language they spoke rather than what their identity was. As a result Ruthenians increased disproportionately to Romanians between 1870 and 1910. Many of these remarks were common among his contemporaries, in particular the critique of the Austrian census policies. He then presented a table of villages in Bukovina in which he records the ethnicity of the local nobles, who were, in their vast majority, Romanian.

At the end of the memorandum Flondor attaches his own ethnographic map of the province (Fig. 6). Using a topographical map he drew a red line which separated the West and North of Bukovina, compactly occupied by Ruthenians and the rest which was, as one moved east, "mixed but more and more Romanian". This line seems to be identical to the one proposed by Costinescu (nos. 28, 59, 60).

²⁵ We can compare it for example with Kiepert's map (fig. 2a), with Langhans' 1915 general map (P. Langhans, *Der rumänische Anteil der Bevölkerung Ungarns, der Bukowina und Bessarabiens*, Berlin 1915), or with de Martonne's 1919 map (Em. de Martonne, *Répartition des Nationalités dans les pays ou dominant les Roumains*, Paris, 1919). See also E. de Martonne, "Essai de carte ethnographique ...". p. 88.

²⁶ On Iancu Flondor see E. Satco, ed., *Enciclopedia Bucovinei*, vol. I, A-F, Iași, 2004, p. 753–756 and Ctin. Loghin, *Iancu cavalier de Flondor (1865–1924)*, Cernăuți, 1944.

Flondor's line presented Brătianu with a well thought compromise supported by a rather balanced understanding of the ethnographic principle. While it still left Ruthenian ethnic territory on the Romanian side, there was also Romanian ethnic territory north of the Pruth to be left to the Russians, so it proposed a quid pro quo. Critically it left Romania the capital of the Province, Czernowitz. Flondor's position was also a step forward from the traditional Romanian concept of countries inhabited by Romanians²⁷ and he took account well of the new method of using ethnographic maps. Flondor concluded: "*Without the Pruth as a border, no deal.*" (italics in the original).

Both Flondor and Costinescu were close friends of Brătianu. Their proposal was also presented in the ethnographic map sent to Petrograd. So, it is safe to assume that Brătianu himself was prepared to accept this line as a solution to the negotiations.

The Costinescu line was more than Sazonov had been initially prepared to concede. Yet he would eventually do so on June 4th 1915. The Russian Foreign Minister telegraphed Poklevsky: "Russia has decided to satisfy all Romanian claims in Bukovina..." (no. 60). In the telegram announcing the same decision, Diamandy recorded Sazonov's informal comments "adopting the Costinescu line we are abandoning to you 30.000 Orthodox Ruthenians. He added *en passant*: we ask you not to deprive them of schools or to denationalize them." (no. 60)

The territorial negotiations would continue for a few weeks. On June 27th Sazonov accepted all of Brătianu's territorial demands (no. 64). Yet there are signs that these concessions were made only under extreme pressure. When Romania would eventually sign the Alliance Treaty in 1916, the new Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, Boris Vladimirovich Stürmer asked Western powers to bear in mind that Romanian claims were exaggerated and would need to be reinterpreted (no. 64). It was another way of stating the hitherto Russian position: Romanian claims overstepped the ethnographic principle, although they claimed to be based on it (nos. 30, 37, 38, 54, 65).

LET'S AGREE TO DISAGREE: THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLE

It is by now clear that although the negotiations had ended successfully the two sides in fact kept their position. Brătianu would remain with the illusion that his demands had been met, while the Russian side had merely postponed them until after the war. Both sides claimed to base their claims on the ethnographic principle, which was the very key point of difference invoked by both sides and from which neither wanted to back down.

²⁷ For these see below, p. 142 ff.

In fact, this difference appeared from the very start of the negotiations in July 1914. From the very first drafts of the neutrality convention two ethnographic clauses were included which spoke of the ethnographic principle: a general one and a particular one for Bukovina.²⁸ In October 1914 this seemed to make both sides happy. Yet by the spring of 1915 both sides returned to negotiate completely dissatisfied with the text of the same convention.

When Diamandy returned to Petrograd in the spring of 1915, he told Poklewsky that he had instructions to conclude an alliance treaty “based on our (i.e. Russian, n.a.) *first proposals* to Romania” (no. 18, italics by us). Among the recently published telegrams in the second volume of Diamandy’s correspondence is a report of a conversation between Diamandy and the British ambassador to Russia, dated 24th of May 1915 (no. 44). Diamandy in his conversation with the ambassador stated his bewilderment at the Allied rejections of Romanian demands. The text of the neutrality convention already had them, Diamandy claimed, he was just presenting the map which illustrated the text. Diamandy was not lying. He had come to the negotiations with a large-scale topographic border map. Romanian demands were not different from the 1914 ones, they were the same, but expressed in a clearer way, in a cartographic form.

Ironically, the same position was taken by Sazonov, after the famous meeting on May 3rd (no. 31). Writing to Poklewsky, Sazonov complained that “the frontier in Bukovina must be drawn, *as we have convened* in our 18th September convention (no. 16, n.a.), based on the *ethnographic principle*, admitting only smaller corrections in regard to reciprocal exchange of small areas, to draw the frontier better.” (italics by us). The same conclusion was drawn in 1930 by Albert Pingaud, perhaps based on Sazonov’s recollections. In this text Sazonov understood, on May the 3rd 1915, that Romanian claims are an exposition of the ethnographic principle as stated in the October 1914 convention, but that in his view they wildly overstretch that principle²⁹.

In fact, when negotiations restarted in the spring of 1915, both sides looked back to the 1914 convention. In that text Romania’s Western and Northern border was presented as based on the ethnographic principle. For both sides the 1915 negotiations meant transforming that principle into a map. As it turned out the way each side interpreted this principle was radically different.

THE TWO OVERLAPPING CLAUSES

Why was there a need, in the 1914 convention for two overlapping clauses?

There was a general clause in which both sided undertook to “reconnait le droit de la Roumanie d’annexer les provinces austro-hongroise dont la population

²⁸ See above, p. 129.

²⁹ Pingaud, *Études Diplomatiques...*, p. 147–148. The article also presents a map of the Romanian proposals and Russian counter-proposals (fig. 1b). This map differs slightly from the Romanian 1919 map (**Fig. 1a**) in Maramuresh and Transcarpathia.

est roumaine” (no. 16). This clause in fact referred to all provinces, Bukovina included. Yet, immediately following the first clause, there was a second one that stated that “cette délimitation sera établie dans la Bucovine par une commission spéciale et composée sur le principe de la majorité mathématique de telle ou telle population...” (no. 16). Placed next to each other this meant that outside of Bukovina the principle of the mathematical majority of the population would not be applied. It is also a sign that the two sides were just beginning to understand what the other side meant by ‘Romanian provinces’.

The wording of the two clauses suggests that the Bukovina clause was added to the general one. This is supported by the first documents as well. The very first telegraphic exchanges about convention does not seem to mention Bukovina, at least on the Romanian side. King Carol I also complained in late August of only vague mentions to Bukovina. In a meeting with leaders of the conservative party he showed that he was informed about the ongoing negotiations with the Russians. In his diary entry of August 24th / September 5th, Marghiloman notes that the king spoke of “the country inhabited by a majority of Romanians” which is exactly the same wording as used in the Diamandy telegrams in the same period. The king also added that he knew nothing of Bukovina.³⁰ The same meeting is attested by another conservative leader present, Nicolae Filipescu. In both texts it is emphasized that the text of the convention was not clear without a map, which had not yet arrived.³¹

The other provinces appear to have been the issue of discussion even later. In the first months the question of the Banat was not raised at all in the negotiations. At least until October 1914 it seems that the only provinces under discussion were Transylvania and Bukovina. On September 10th (no. 4) Sazonov spoke exactly of these two entities and the same is repeated next day. In the journal of Maurice Paléologue, France’s ambassador to Petrograd, he notes on August 6th that Sazonov was offering “the territories inhabited today by a Romanian population, that is largest part of Transylvania and Northern Bukovina.”³² It is interesting that

³⁰ Al. Marghiloman, *Note Politice*, vol. I, p. 179–180: “September the 5th (1914, n.a.). Sinaia. ... Audience with the King (Carol I, n.a.). Four points. 1. Verification of Russian proposals. For the first point, the King: nothing precise in the Russian proposal, only once formulated at the beginning of August. “The country inhabited by a majority of Romanians”. They should have sent an annexed map in 3 days, but it never arrived. And for Bukovina, only a vague mention.” (trans. by author).

³¹ N. Polizu-Micșunești, ed., *Nicolae Filipescu. Însemnări 1914–1916*, București, 2017, p. 122: “Filipescu knows about Marghiloman’s audience with the King. About the agreement with Russia, the King knows only what Brătianu let him know, that the Russians are not sending the map with the details of the agreement, which, Filipescu thinks, shows the perfidy of Brătianu because he himself knows the exact opposite is true from Poklevsky.” (trans. by author).

³² M. Paléologue, *Rusia țarilor în vremea Marelui Război. 20 iulie 1914 – 2 iunie 1915*, 2017, p. 78: “6/19 August 1914. Sazonov tells me that he has called on the legate of Romania, Diamandy, to ask for the immediate cooperation of the Romanian army against Austria. In return he offers to guarantee to the cabinet in Bucharest the right to annex all territories inhabited today by a Romanian population, that is the largest part of Transylvania and Northern Bukovina; what’s more the Entente powers will guarantee Romania the integrity of its territory.” trans. by author.

Paléologue felt the need to explain what territories inhabited by Romanians actually mean. The same lack of familiarity with the detailed ethnographic situation (who can blame him) could explain Northern Bukovina as a mistake for Southern Bukovina. Similarly, another conservative politician, Nicolae Grigore Polizu-Micșunești, a close collaborator of Nicolae Filipescu wrote in his diary on September 6th, 1914: “Everyone is worried that Russia will take Transylvania and Bukovina before we have entered the conflict.”³³ The Italian representative in Bucharest wrote a report on September 25th in which he described Romanian aspirations as the “territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians, that is part of Bukovina, Transylvania and most of the territories between Transylvania and the Tisza.”³⁴

These contemporary testimonies show that Romanian requests were formulated during the negotiations. Initially the discussion centred on a general clause speaking of Romanian territories/provinces/countries. Bukovina, situated between Romania and Tsarist Russia was the object of a special clause. Other Slavic population in the Banat or Maramuresh seems to have become a subject at a later date. This continuous series of stumbling blocks is perhaps telling of the haste in which the negotiations had been concluded. It also allows us to understand what the two clauses of the convention meant. Sazonov was ready to allow Romania claim anything it wanted from Hungary and so was content with the general clause. When it came to Slavic populations, he needed to add the second more detailed cause about Bukovina³⁵. These acted as safeguards against Romanian demands. The Romanian side resented these safeguards and seems to have preferred to return to the original, general, clause (no. 40).

What Sazonov meant by the ethnographic principle is quite clear. He proposed Romania occupy only *that part* of Bukovina inhabited by Romanians. For the Russian Foreign Minister, the ethnographic principle meant gathering statistical data in the field and separating those villages with Romanians from those with Ruthenians (nos. 6, 7). On the contrary, he had little interest in defining exactly what Romania claimed to be ‘territories inhabited by Romanians’ outside of Bukovina.

³³ Polizu-Micșunești, ed., *Nicolae Filipescu...*, p. 124 (trans. by author).

³⁴ Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului, *1918 la români. Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Documente externe, 1879–1916*, vol. 1, București, 1983, p. 503–504: “Bucharest September 25th 1914, 22h, Rome, September 26th 1914, Nr. 9521. I am informed, strictly confidentially, that last night the Russian minister gave Brătianu the following proposals from which to choose: 1. In case of military cooperation, the obligation of the Triple Entente to ensure Romania’s right to rule the entire territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians, that is part of Bukovina, Transylvania and most of the territories between Transylvania and the Tisza. 2. In case of neutrality, only Transylvania.... (s) Fasciotti “(trans. by author).

³⁵ He states the same opinion in his memoirs: “There was no difficulty about giving Rumania parts of Hungary, populated by Rumanians, who were anxious to escape from the Magyar yoke; it was a foregone conclusion that they should be united to Rumania. Difficulties arose when M. Bratiano claimed provinces in which the Rumanian element was much less prevalent, as for instance in Bukovina and Banat, where Russian and Serbian interests were involved” quote from S. Sazonov, *Fateful Years, 1909–1916: The Reminiscences of Serge Sazonov*, London, 1928, p. 265.

COUNTRIES, LANDS, REGIONS, PARTS, PROVINCES, TERRITORIES

The various drafts of the military convention of 1914 show a continuous shift in the wording of the ethnographic clause. They speak of *pays*, *provinces*, *regions*, *parties* and *territoires*. In chronological order the terms used are the following³⁶:

No. doc.	Date	Terms used
2	8 Aug. 1914	The countries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanian population
3	10 Aug. 1914	The countries of Hungary whose majority population is Romanian
4	11 Sept. 1914	The territories of Transylvania and Bukovina inhabited by Romanians in the majority
6	11 Sept. 1914	Transylvania and Bukovina inhabited by a Romanian population in the majority
8	13 Sept. 1914	The provinces of Austro-Hungary whose population is Romanian
9	13 Sept. 1914	All regions form the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians
10	15 Sept. 1914	The Russian and the Romanian parts of Bukovina
12	15 Sept. 1914	The Regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians
13	15 Sept. 1914	The Regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians
15	18 Sept. 1914	Territories of the monarchy inhabited by Romanians
16	20 Sept. 1914	The Austro-Hungarian provinces whose population is Romanian

What made the negotiators be so unsure of the terminology? What was the difference, in their mind, between all these terms? Taken in abstract, several interpretations of each term are possible. The term *province* points to administrative units such as the Banat. *Province* is similar to *region* although the latter could refer to smaller administrative units such as a county. Other terms however, such as *territoire*, are vaguer and could be applied to arbitrarily defined areas such as the partition of a single province in two. Yet the context shows that for the diplomatic actors in these negotiations these terms had a similar meaning.

The most telling of all these terms is the term *country* (in French *pays*, in Romanian *țară*) which was used right in the beginning of the negotiations (nos. 2, 3 and 4). The term *pay* usually refers to a historical and political construct with well-defined borders. It is a complex concept that combines people, soil, economy, routes of transportation and ethnicity. It is not a flexible concept that could be connected to an ethnographic map.

LES PAYS ROUMAINES AND ROMANIAN ‘NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS’

The term ‘country’, in Romanian cartography, referred to Romanian national aspirations ever since the unification of 1859. The first map to use this term

³⁶ The translations of the following terms from the original French were made by the author.

appeared in 1864, even before the name Romania became official. It was Filipescu-Dubău's *The Map of the United Principalities of Romania and of the neighbouring countries of Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia*³⁷. These countries were not Romania's neighbours, but precisely those regions Romania claimed. The habit of referring national aspirations as *countries*³⁸ stuck and by 1914 almost all maps and schoolbooks used it. Although the list of countries that formed part of the ideal national state continued to change, they were still referred to by this term of *neighboring countries inhabited by Romanians*. They were present in all history and geography schoolbooks. Take for example the map of Traian Georgescu, *Romania and the neighbouring countries inhabited by Romanians*, Bucharest 1915 (**Fig. 7**).³⁹ It covers the land between the Tisza, Dniester and Danube, with the addition of Dobrudja. The title of this map implies that it is an ethnographic map, yet it does not represent ethnographic presence through patches of colour or other means. It is not based on census data. It simply takes it for granted that these countries *are* inhabited by Romanians.

It is not by chance that the wording of Traian Georgescu's map is exactly the one of the ethnographic clause in the negotiations. The idea of 'countries inhabited by Romanians' referred specifically to those territories where the ethnographic principle favoured (in a general way) Romanians. It did not mean those territories where "the mathematical majority of the population" was Romanian. Brătianu and Diamandy were demanding in the negotiations Romanian national aspirations with which they were familiar. They, from their point of view, were not motivated by greed, but by the Romanian cultural image of what national aspirations should be.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLE AS SEEN BY THE ROMANIAN SIDE

For the Romanian side the ethnographic principle should be understood as a combination of history and ethnography. It meant an area, as much as possible historically defined and maintaining administrative and political borders, which was inhabited at least in part by Romanians and which was claimed based on historical grounds.

The Timok, for example was inhabited by Romanians, but was not historically part of Romanian national aspirations, so Diamandy or Brătianu never

³⁷ N. Filipescu-Dubău, *Charta Principatelor Unite ale României cu circumvecinele terri Banatul, Transilvania, Bukowina și Bassarabia redigiata după cele mai sigure izvoare și dedicate In'altimei sale Alessandru Ioan I, primulu Domnu alu României*, Iasi, 1864.

³⁸ On the implications of this vocabulary see M. Coman, "Spațiul Românesc. Interpretarea teleologică a geografiei naționale", *Revista Istorică* XVII, 2006, 1–4, p. 54–61; D.A. Lixandru, "L'invention de la «Grande» Roumanie: nationalisme territorial et pratique géographique jusqu'au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale", *Romanian Journal of Geography*, 63, 2019, 1, p. 19–40.

³⁹ T. Georgescu, *Harta generală a României cu țările învecinate locuite de români*, București, 1915. The 1:900.000 scale this map was probably designed for public display in schools and other state institutions.

claimed it. Neither had Dobrudja been until 1878 when Romania was forced by the Great Powers to accept it. After 1878 it was gradually incorporated in the “territories inhabited by Romanians” and became a ‘Romanian country’.⁴⁰

Pursuing this concept meant that Romanian elites did not pay much attention to the actual ethnography of those territories. Very few ethnographic maps were drawn in Romania until 1915 and most of those focused on Cutzo-Vlachs in Greece or Macedonia. Romania’s claims were not justified by the disposition of Romanian ethnic population in the field. Rather Romania claimed provinces which had Romanian population and were seen as part of Romanian history. True, a Romanian country could contain other ethnic groups as well, but this was seen as the result of immigration or forced de-nationalization. The presence of other ethnic groups did not break the unity nor change the Romanian character of a country.

It was also argued that provinces were historical entities which could not be divided, even when ethnographically this would be possible. The clearest case was Bukovina, where population was largely homogenous and could be easily divided on ethnographic lines. Flondor argued against small scale separations in his memorandum on Bukovina (no. 20):

It is only natural that on the basis of the principle of nationalities the relative majority of the population will decide the fate of the territory it inhabits. It is also incontestable that small portions – communes or villages – will not be considered, but only larger territory with natural borders as much as possible....

Flondor’s position was shared by many in Romania’s political elites and especially by Brătianu. One of his closest collaborators, Gheorghe Duca, will state in his memoirs:

As for the whole Banat, this was a key point in Brătianu’s program. The Banat was, in his view, should be seen as a single unity, a geographical, political and economic unity. [...] Throughout history everyone respected this unity. So as a whole, not in pieces, did the Banat pass from one domination to another [...] The argument that in the Banat there were about 200.000 Serbs was without weight. In Serbia, in the Timok valley, weren’t there 300.000 Romanians? Is this a reason for Romania to invoke the strict application of the nationalities principle and to cross the Danube? [...] Of course, the principle of nationalities was the only criterion according to which the map of tomorrow’s Europe should be established, but people throughout the restless struggles of history settled in such a way that a rigid application of the principles of nationalities was impossible.⁴¹

The ethnographic principle meant for the Romanian claiming entire provinces, rather than arbitrarily divided ones.

⁴⁰ On Dobroudja see C. Iordachi, “*La Californie des Roumains: L’intégration de la Dobroudja du Nord à la Roumanie, 1878–1913*”, *Balkanologie* VI, 2002, 1–2, p. 167–197.

⁴¹ I.G. Duca, *Memorii*, Vol. 2. *Războiul*, București, 1993, p. 182, 183.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ROMANIAN ETHNOGRAPHIC SKETCHES

Both the *General* and the *Bukovina Sketches* adopted cartographic choices which may at first sight appear curious. They also show differences between each other, even though they were probably drawn by the same cartographer at the same time. All these choices can be easily understood if we contextualize the maps in the negotiations.

The first question is that of date. Brătianu mentions sending the Romanian ethnographic maps on the 17th/30th of May 1915. This means that the preparation of the maps had begun in the early spring. The nature of the negotiations, as we have discussed above, changed radically after the meeting on May 3rd. First, it became clear that Bukovina and the Banat were the main points of contention and not the Romanian-Hungarian border. Second, it became clear to the Romanian side, who had prepared itself to argue for whole provinces that the Russians would insist on a 'rigid' application of the principle of nationalities. The two ethnographic maps actually show this shifting point.

The *Bukovina Sketch*, as we have shown, displays more Romanian green than Ruthenian yellow. It does so in contradiction to most other ethnographic maps of the period (Kiepert, Langhans or de Martonne). This system of representation is perfect if one argues for the whole province. So, this map supported the initial Romanian demands for the whole of Bukovina. Yet when negotiations shifted to dividing the province, the *Bukovina Sketch* offered the Romanian side less territory than it wanted to concede, even less than the Costinescu line.

The *General Sketch* likewise, supports Romania's initial arguments. In the Banat Romanian mono-colour is overall dominant. Yet in Eastern Banat the Serbian element is dominant and Romanian colour is attested only as a 30% minority. So, the map is an excellent tool to argue for the whole of the province but a poor tool if the division of Banat is considered.

The *General Sketch* shows a strong Romanian presence (50%) to the West of the Arad-Oradea-Satu Mare line, in an area where other ethnographic maps show very little. Again, this choice was intended to show an overall Romanian majority in the counties of Csanád, Békés, Bihar and Szatmár.

The Romanian cartography that was designed to document the negotiations supported the same arguments as those apparent in the telegrams themselves: the ethnographic principle should be applied only over large areas such as provinces or counties.

THE 'RIGID APPLICATION' OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITIES

It is worth asking at this point how did other people expect to apply the principle of nationalities? Was Duca right in claiming that it could not be applied to very small areas?

In Romanian society Duca's opinion was clearly well supported. The idea of 'countries inhabited by Romanians' was very popular and even more so the expression 'from the Tisza to the Dniester'. This situation deserves a more systematic treatment which would derail the theme of the present article, but there are signs of this even in the negotiations correspondence.

On the 16th of April Brătianu telegraphed Diamandy to assure him that Take Ionescu had given his support for the 'Tisza and the Pruth' (no. 19). It is true that later on, when he found out that the city of Czernowitz was stalling negotiations, Take Ionescu favoured giving it up. The Conservative leader wanted a rapid entrance into the war and therefore was more flexible on the negotiations. He exploded: "Czernowitz? But we do not need Czernowitz. Czernowitz is not a Romanian city, it is a Jewish city. If I were Brătianu (an idea everpresent in Take's mind – n.a.), I would be happy to get rid of a few thousand Jews. Don't I have enough of them in Moldavia?"⁴² These are not contradicting sources. Take Ionescu was willing to compromise, but if negotiations would allow him to get all "the countries inhabited by Romanians", even better. In that he would have seen no harm. For the same reasons Flondor and Costinescu (and behind them Brătianu himself) were willing to accept Bukovina up to the Pruth, but only because it was proving almost impossible to obtain all of it.

We can better understand the thinking of Romania's political elite if we look at the Crown Council of August 14th, 1916. By then Brătianu had concluded the negotiations and had decided to enter the war. A Crown Council was convened to gather the support of the Romanian political elites. In several sources it is stated that Brătianu described what Romania would receive for entering the war⁴³:

Marghiloman: (Brătianu speaking, n.a.): '...we will be admitted the right to annex [territory, n.a.] up to the Tisza, the Banat, Crişana, Upper Maramuresh, which is Slav and Bukovina up to the Pruth' (trans. by author)

Filipescu: (Brătianu speaking, n.a.): '...the conditions in which we are entering the war are: Transylvania to the Tisza, the Banat, Crişana, Maramuresh (north), Bukovina to the Pruth'. (trans. by author)

What is striking in these two independent sources is that Brătianu aggrandized the extent of his diplomatic achievements. He did so to impress political leaders and to make the war more appealing. He claimed to have obtained more of the "countries inhabited by Romanians" than he actually did. Most noteworthy is Northern Maramuresh, which, he added, 'is Slav'. Brătianu had in fact not obtained this part, but it was a rather minor loss. He could easily explain later that one difficulty or another meant sacrificing Northern Maramuresh.

There was, of course, no protest in the Crown Council about obtaining territory which was not ethnographically Romanian, because it was part of the 'countries inhabited by Romanians'.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 185.

⁴³ Mamina, *Consilii*..., p. 65 (Marghiloman) and 67 (Filipescu).

Outside of Romania the concept of “the countries inhabited by Romanians” was largely unknown. Nobody expected Romania to demand so much territory. We can see this in several maps produced before or during the war. In a German map of 1909 that explained the troublesome situation in the Balkans, Romania’s aspirations were thought to be those loosely based on the ethnographic principle (Fig. 8). Even more telling is a map published by Emmanuel de Martonne in 1915, called *La Roumanie Carpathique* (Fig. 9). The map was a direct call for Romania’s intervention from one of Romania’s closest friends⁴⁴. De Martonne, clearly without connection to Brătianu, proposed that Romania achieve its national aspirations on the basis of a strict application of the ethnographic principle (Fig. 9b). In fact, the borders de Martonne proposed on this map are smaller than those he himself would advocate in his more famous 1919 map⁴⁵. On the map, clearly drawn outside Romanian territory was the capital of Bukovina, Czernowitz.

There was a clear divide between the Romanian and Western views of what Romanian national aspirations should be. The concept of “countries inhabited by Romanians”, so dear to Romanian elites was not accepted and not even understood outside the country. This dissonance would shake Romanian political and cultural elites in 1919 and, closer to our theme, led in 1914–1916 to the *de facto* failure of the negotiations.

ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Today we would have little difficulty in understanding that the Romanian Russian negotiations were in fact a dispute over the separation of single provinces on strict ethnographic lines versus keeping them intact. Yet in 1914 this was not clear. The telegrams between Diamandy and Brătianu and between Poklewsky and Sazonov show that the two sides did not understand each other. The Russian side did not understand the meaning of the phrase “*territories / countries / provinces*

⁴⁴ Very little has been written on de Martonne’s activity in 1914–1915 before he left for the United States. On de Martonne’s relationship with Romania see T. Ter-Minassian, “Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la Conférence de la Paix en 1919”, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 44, 1997, 2, p. 252–86; E. Boulineau, “Un géographe traceur de frontières: Emmanuel de Martonne et la Roumanie”, *L’Espace géographique*, 30, 2001, 4, p. 358–369; G. Palsky, “Emmanuel de Martonne and the Ethnographical Cartography of Central Europe (1917–1920)”, *Imago Mundi* 54, 2002, p. 111–119; G. Bowd, *Un géographe français et la Roumanie. Emmanuel de Martonne (1873–1955)*, Paris, 2012; Idem and D. Clayton, “Emmanuel de Martonne and the wartime defence of Greater Romania: Circle, set square and spine”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, XXX, 2014, p. 1–14; N. Enciu, V. Ursu, *Emmanuel de Martonne, l’avocat de la Roumanie à la Conférence de Paix à Paris en 1919–1920 en matière de la Bessarabie*, 2018; S. Suveica, “Between Science, Politics and Propaganda. Emmanuel de Martonne and the debates on the status of Bessarabia (1919–1920)”, in *Cahiers du monde russe* 58, 2017, 4, p. 589–614.

⁴⁵ More on this in S. Anghel, *The War of Maps. Romanian Cartography at the Paris Peace Conference*, forthcoming.

inhabited by Romanians” in Romanian minds and that the Romanian side did not at first grasp that the ethnographic principle meant dividing territory based on census returns and on coloured maps.

One element would shake the negotiations to the very core: the use of an ethnographic map. Diamandy’s reaction to the patches of colour shows that the map made Sazonov’s arguments much more appealing than that of “territories inhabited by Romanians”.

Ethnographic map and the principles attached to them would actually signal the failure of the negotiations. As we have seen above the Russian side gradually gave in to Brătianu’s demands. We have also seen that they were not ready to actually follow through at the end of the war. In fact the very text of the political alliance of 1916 made this clear. In this document the ethnographic principle was completely abandoned (no. 65). The text spoke only of territories, but not of ethnography:

Art. 3. – La France, la Grande Bretagne, l’Italie et la Russie reconnaissent à la Roumanie le droit d’annexer les territoires de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise stipulés et déterminés à l’article 4.

Art. 4. – Les limites des territoires mentionnés à l’article précédent sont fixées comme suit : ... (there follows a long list of geographical markers, n.a.)

Article 3 only refers to article 4 and the latter is only a textual version of the border map Romania had presented (**Fig. 1**). Removing the ethnographic principle from the territorial clause also meant depriving it of its strength. At any time, the ethnographic principle could be invoked against the alliance, as in fact it would be in Paris in 1919. Articles 3 & 4 were for Russia a safeguard against Romania’s claims.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLE, NEGOTIATIONS AND ROMANIAN CARTOGRAPHY

Ethnographic maps were not unknown in Romanian culture, but until 1914 they were not perceived as important. In fact, there were almost no Romanian drawn ethnographic maps on which Diamandy could base his negotiations at Tsarskoye Selo.⁴⁶ There was an excellent map of the province of Transylvania made by Nicolae Mazere in 1909. It was a personal effort by Mazere based on an exhaustive research of local Romanian church censuses.⁴⁷ In cartographic matters he was guided by Emmanuel de Martonne. Yet the map covered only the province Transylvania proper which was not really under discussion in the negotiations.

⁴⁶ Very little has been written on Romanian created maps before 1914. See O.-C. Ioniță, *Les Cartes de la Grande Roumanie*, Dissertation Université Laval, Québec, 2006, p. 15–27 and p. 32–8.

⁴⁷ N. Mazere, *Harta etnografică a Transilvaniei*, București, 1909; Idem, *Supliment la Harta etnografică a Transilvaniei*, București, 1909.

There were also very few popularization maps available. The first one was, to our knowledge, Gheorghe Munteanu Murgoci and Ion Popa-Burcă's *Ethnographic Map of Romania of the Territory situated between the Danube, the Dniester and the Tisza*, published 1903 in Alexandru Vlahoutza's *La Roumanie Pittoresque*.⁴⁸ On the preceding page of the same volume, the same authors published another map called *Map of Romania and the surrounding countries inhabited by Romanians*. Murgoci and Burcă were the most popular authors of geography schoolbooks before the war. In these schoolbooks they use the terms territory and countries interchangeably.⁴⁹ There was also a map in the third volume of the first Romanian Encyclopedia edited by Corneliu Diaconovich and published by Astra 1904. Entitled '*Ethnographic Map of the Countries Inhabited by Romanians*', it is unsigned (**Fig. 10**) and we will refer to it as the Diaconovich map.⁵⁰ It was a curious combination of motley elements. It was mono-coloured map which represented only the Romanian ethnic group on a white background. The spatial layout of the Romanian ethnic group follows that of Austro-Hungarian maps of the period and the Diaconovich map certainly followed Austro-Hungarian official census data. So, patches of Romanian colour occupied far less space to the West compared to later Romanian maps, but a lot of space to the East, in Transnistria. In fact, the Tisza is not present on the map, in contrast with most Romanian maps of the period. The most curious element is the title. Although it speaks of Romanian *countries*, these are not addressed on the map. Not even the name Transylvania appears. The concept of 'countries inhabited by Romanians' is of Romanian origin, but it was not carried through. It was simply added to an ethnographic map on which almost no modifications were made. The combination of the terms ethnography and that of "countries inhabited by Romanians" would at first sight seem obtuse and self-contradictory. Yet seen in the light of the negotiations which would happen 10 years later the title and the map are quite clear. It is in fact hybrid, a combination of Romanian and foreign cartographic elements, which were not yet harmonized.

The map accompanied the entry "Romanians", a long exposé signed by Dimitrie Onciul⁵¹ in which terms such as *territory*, *provinces*, *parts* or *countries* are used interchangeably. Onciul's text allows one to understand the fundamentally historical logic behind the 'countries inhabited by Romanians'. It also allows one to see how, in this logic, ethnography was subordinated to history.

With the war, Romanian ethnographic maps would dramatically increase in numbers. Most of them bore titles similar to the Diaconovich map:

⁴⁸ M. Murgoci, I. Popa-Burcă, "Carte ethnographique du territoire situé entre le Danube, le Nister et la Tisza", Al. Vlahoutza, *La Roumanie Pittoresque*, Bucarest, 1903, p. 330.

⁴⁹ M. Murgoci, I. Popa-Burcă, *România și Țările Locuite de Români*, București, 1914, p. 120–125.

⁵⁰ C. Diaconovich (ed.), *Enciclopedia Română publicată din însărcinarea și sub auspiciile Asociațiunii pentru literatura română și cultura poporului român*, tom III: Kemet – Zymotic, Sibiu 1904, facing p. 794.

⁵¹ D. Onciul, 'Românii', in C. Diaconovich, ed., *Enciclopedia Română*, tom III Kemet – Zymotic, Sibiu 1904, p. 795–802.

- *The Ethnographic Map of the Romanian Lands under the Dominion of Austro-Hungary as well as a Part of the Spread of the Romanian Element on the Right Side of the Danube*, (by Aurelian Florinescu, 1914).⁵²
- *The Ethnographic Map of the Countries inhabited by Romanians under the dominion of Austro-Hungary including Transylvania, Temisana, Bukovina and five Counties from Crișana and Maramures* (by Florian Stanciovi, 1914).⁵³
- *The Ethnographic Map of Romanian territories of Hungary: the Banat (Timisana), Crișana and Maramures*, (by Valentin Popa 1915).⁵⁴
- *The Ethnographic Map of Romanian land* (by Valentin Popa and Nicolae Istrate 1916).⁵⁵

The titles of these maps combine the traditional Romanian concept of “territories inhabited by Romanians” with that of an ethnographic map in the same way the Diaconovich map did ten years before. The authors of these maps, none in fact professional cartographers, were apparently struggling with the same problems as the author(s) of the Diaconovich map. They had to combine the traditional Romanian mode of representation of Romanian countries with the medium of an ethnographic map.

This analysis of Romanian ethnographic maps shows that even as late as 1914 ethnographic maps were synonymous with maps of countries/territories inhabited by Romanians. Ethnographic maps had entered Romanian society but had not yet occupied an important space. They were thought to be just another type of argument that could be added to historical ones. They had been integrated in the concept of “countries inhabited by Romanian”. The Romanian-Russian negotiations served as a wakening call.

The first years of the First World War were transitional ones in Romanian ethnographic cartography, shifting towards new and more professional ethnographic maps. Truly professional ethnographic maps would appear only after the census of 1930 and the emergence of a new generation of cartographers, such as Vintilă Mihăilescu.

⁵² A. Florinescu, *Harta etnografică a ținuturilor românești de sub dominația Austro-Ungară cum și o parte a întinderii elementului românesc din dreapta Dunării*, București, 1914.

⁵³ A.F. Stanciovi, *Harta etnografică a țărilor locuite de români sub dominația austro-ungară incluzând Transilvania, Temisana, Bucovina Temisana, Bucovina și cinci comitate din Crișana și Maramureș*, Craiova, 1915.

⁵⁴ V. Popa, “*Harta etnografică a teritoriilor românești din Ungaria: Banatul (Timișana), Crișana și Maramureș*”, in V. Popa, N. Istrate, *Transilvania, Banatul, Crișana și Maramureșul*, București, 1915.

⁵⁵ V. Popa, N. Istrate, *Harta etnografică a ținutului românesc*, București, 1916.




Fig. 1a. La Roumanie devant le Congrès de la Paix, Bucharest 1919. Annexe III. approx. 1:5.000.000.

Legend : This map was published in 1919 as preparation for the Peace Conference in Paris. It was annexed to the text of the Alliance Treaty of 1916. It also serves as an ethnographic map only where Romanian ethnic population existed outside of Romania's borders (i.e. the Timok and Transnistria).






Fig. 1b. Albert Pingaud, *Greater Romania*, from A. Pingaud, "Études Diplomatiques: L'Entente et la Roumanie. 3 Mai-22 Aout 1915", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, (1er MAI 1930), pp. 148. Approx. 1:8.000.000.



a.



b.



c.

Fig. 2a, 2b, 2c.: Fragments of Kiepert's 1882 ethnographic map. H. Kiepert, *Völker- und Sprachen-Karte von Österreich und den Unter-Donau-Ländern*, Berlin, 1882. 1:3 000 000 <https://goobi-viewer.univie.ac.at/viewer/fullscreen/AC03904675/1/> 2a: Romania and claimed territories. 2b: the Banat. 2c: Bukovina. Lines added by author. In red, the "countries inhabited by Romanians." In black, the Brătianu line.




Fig. 3c Same map with the Brătianu line.




Fig. 4a. Unknown author, *An Ethnographic Sketch of the lands of Bukovina inhabited by Romanians*, 1915. BCU Cluj.




Fig. 4b Legend of the same map.




Fig. 5a P. Langhans, Die Umgangssprache der anwesenden Bevölkerung in der Bukowina, Berlin 1915, Berlin; 100×80cm; 1/300.000.



Fig. 5b Fragment of the same map showing the capital Czernowitz and its immediate surroundings.




Fig. 5c Fragment P. Langhans, *Der rumänische Anteil der Bevölkerung Ungarns, der Bukowina und Bessarabiens*, Berlin 1915 50 × 63cm; 1/1.500.000 showing Bukovina.




Fig. 5d. Fragment of the same map showing the Banat.



Fig. 6a. Flondor's map of Bukovina, 1915. ANR, SANIC Fond Flondor 945 f 15. This map was annexed to his memorandum on the possible division of the province. On a topographical map he added a dotted red line and a legend, which reads: “*** the line that separates the West of Bukovina inhabited in compact masses by Ruthenians.” (trans. by author).




Fig. 6b. Interpretation of Flondor's map, redrawn by author.



Fig. 7. Georgescu's 1915 map of Romania and neighbouring countries inhabited by Romanians.
Property of the author.



Fig. 8. Map of Balkan aspirations. Original German of 1909 reprinted in French in 1915.
L'Instantané, no. 11 (3/3 1915) fig. 25761. Romanian aspirations are thought to be well East
of the Tisza river.



Fig. 9a. Emmanuel de Martonne, *La Roumanie Carpathique*. 1915.
 With a dotted line is de Martonne's proposed Western border for Romania.




Fig. 9b. Same map superimposed with proposed border lines. Lines added by author.
 In red, the "countries inhabited by Romanians." In yellow, the Brătianu line.
 In blue, the line drawn by de Martonne (fig. 9a).




Fig. 10. The Ethnographic Map of the Countries inhabited by Romanians, 1904.

DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX

The list of documents presented herewith is gathered from various archives, which are listed below. Very few are unpublished. All the documents were written in French. Wherever possible we have left the documents in the original French, but in the cases in which we have seen only a Romanian version of the French original we translated the Romanian into English. For the sake of brevity we only present the fragments relevant to the territorial clauses of the negotiations.

1. Telegram from Diamandy on Sazonov's proposal of a Romanian-Russian neutrality convention

From Petersburg. No. 855. Year 1914, 23rd July/5 August
Urgent. Excellence Porumbaru, Externe, Bucarest. Strictement personnel et confidentiel
Aujourd'hui le mercredi 23 Juillet, a 7 heures du soir, j'ai eu un entretien avec Mr. Sazonow. Il m-a remis le texte du projet de la convention éventuelle russo-roumaine, à laquelle serait annexée une carte. [...]

(s) Diamandy

Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (henceforth AMAE) 1914 E71 partea 2, vol. 32, f. 67. Unpublished.

2. Telegram from Diamandy on Sazonov's draft of the text of a Romanian-Russian convention

Deciphered telegram. From the Legation in Petrograd. Nr. 874 din 26 iulie/ 8 august 1914
Excellence Porumbaru, Externe Bucharest
De la part de Monseieur Sazonov [...] il mettait de l'insistance pressante que je télégraphie d'ici le text de l'accord que le Gouvernement Imperial propose à la Roumanie. [...]

II. La Russie s'engage de ne pas cesser la guerre contre l'Autriche-Hongrie avant que les pays de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise habitées par une population roumaine ne soient réunis à la Couronne de Roumanie. L'étendue des pays compris par cet article est indiquée sur la carte ci-annexée. [...] FINIS

[what follows are Sazonov's notes on the text of the convention.] [...] La carte dont traite le paragraphe II reste à être encore déterminée. Le principe de la majorité de la population d'après la statistique même austro-hongroise pourrait servir de norme.

(s) Diamandy 874

AMAE 1914 E71 partea 2, vol. 32, f. 82, 82v, 83. Unpublished.

3. Brătianu telegraphs his response to Poklevsky's proposal of a military convention between Romania and Russia.

Sinaia, le 28 juillet / 10 août 1914. Résumé d'une conversation de Monsieur Bratiano, Président de Conseil, avec Monsieur Poklewski, Ministre de Russie.

Monsieur Poklewski est chargé par son Gouvernement de proposer une convention militaire ayant pour but une coopération contre l’Autriche-Hongrie; en échange, les trois puissances de la Triple Entente garantissent que la paix ne sera pas conclue sans annexer à la Roumanie, les pays de Hongrie, où la majorité de la population est roumaine, conformément à une carte que Monsieur Poklewski attend par le premier courrier.
[sans signature]

Arhivele Naționale ale României, Serviciului Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale (henceforth ANR SANIC), Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 110-112. *Documente privind istoria românilor, colecția „Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki”, Seria a 3-a, volumul I, Legația Română la Petrograd (1914–1918)/ Documente*; editori: Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Eugen-Tudor Sclifos; București – Brăila, 2018, nr. 13 (henceforth *Legația Română*); Elena Mușat, Dumitru Laura, eds., *Constantin Diamandi, ministru al României la Petrograd, Vol. I. Memorii, corespondență diplomatică 1914-1915*, București, 2020 (henceforth *Diamandy ANR I*).

4. Telegram from Diamandy to Brătianu concerning the ongoing negotiations with Sazonov on the text of a military convention between Romania and Russia

Pétrograd, le 11 septembre 1914. Télégr. Chiffré N° 1081. Exc[ellence] Brătianu, Président Conseil – Bucarest.

Suite de mon dernier télégramme no. 1067 (no. 3 above).

Territoires de Transylvanie et Bucovine habités majorité roumains sont réservés à Roumanie et constituent son lot, qu’elle peut occuper et dont elle peut prendre possession le moment venu; mais ce geste elle doit le faire elle-même.

Legația Română, nr. 17, *Diamandy ANR I* 94.

5. Poklevsky telegraphs Sazonov regarding Romanian worries

1/14 September 1914, nr. 261

[...] faire entrer les troupes Roumaines dans la partie de la Bucovine occupée par nos troupes et peuplée de Roumains...dissiperait la crainte qui existe dans certains milieu de notre intention d’annexer à la Russie les provinces de l’Autriche-Hongrie peuplées de Roumains.

(s) Poklevski

Documents diplomatiques secrets Russes, 1914-1917: d’après les archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères à Pétrograd, trans. by J. Polonsky, Paris, 1928, 175 (henceforth Polonsky), Vadim Guzun, ed., *Intrarea României în Primul Război Mondial. Negocierile diplomatice în documente din arhivele ruse, 1914-1916*, Cluj-Napoca, 2016, 32, p. 152 (henceforth Guzun).

6. Telegram from Diamandy to Brătianu concerning the ongoing negotiations with Sazonov on the text of a military convention between Romania and Russia.

Pétrograd, la nuit du 10 au 11 septembre 1914. Tel. chif. N. 1067

Ex[cellence] Bratiano Presid[ent] Cons[eil] Buc[arest].

3) Russie, après tous les sacrifices et les efforts surhumains qu'elle fait, veut arriver à créer de choses stables parmi les peuples de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, sur base principe nationalités. Du traine dont vont les choses en Galicie – a poursuivi M. Sazonow, l'appoint militaire de la Roumanie ne nous est plus nécessaire. Maintenant nous convions simplement la Roumanie à occuper ce qui lui revient, c' à d[ire] Transylvanie et Bucovine, habitées par des populations roumaines. Russie n'occupera pas la Transylvanie puisqu'elle n'a pas intention de la garder pour elle. En Bucovine nous pourrions établir un condominium.

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 123–124.

Legăția Română, nr. 14, *Diamandy ANR I 90*.

7. Sazonov invites Romania to occupy part of Bukovina

3/16 September 1916, nr. 2680

La distribution dans la Bucovine des troupes russes et roumaines pourrait être faite sur une entente mutuelle des commandants en chef des deux armées, et fondée uniquement sur des raisons d'ordre militaire, sans que cela influe plus tard sur la délimitation des territoires, qui aura lieu à son heure après une entente entre les gouvernements et d'accord avec l'ethnographie de la population.

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky 176, Guzun 34, p. 153.

8. Sazonov telegraphs Brătianu about the draft of the text of the convention

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.
13/26 septembre 1914, no. 2922.

[...] J'ai élaboré d'accord avec Diamandi le projet suivant d'une entente avec la Roumanie, que vous voudrez bien transmettre à Bratiano: „La Russie s'engage à reconnaître le droit de la Roumanie à annexer les provinces de l'Autriche Hongrie dont la population est roumaine. Dans la Bucovine, la délimitation des provinces qui doivent être annexées par la Russie ou la Roumanie aura pour principe la majorité ethnique de la population. [...]

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky p. 178.

9. Diamandy reports on the same draft as the one described by Sazonov above.

P[é]t[ro]g[rad], le 13 / 26 sep[tembre] 1914

Ex[cellence] Bratiano, Président Conseil Bucarest. tél. ch. N. 1098

I improvised a text which had been redacted by us [Diamandy and Sazonov, n.a.] and I even submitted it to his approval. We agreed on the following formulae: [...] Russia undertakes to accept Romania's right to annex all regions from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by Romanians. In regards to Bukovina, the principle of the majority of the population will serve as criterion to delimit the territories and to have them annexed by Romania or by Russia. [...]

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 148, 148v, 149.

Diamandy ANR I 101.

10. Poklevsky reports on Brătianu's answer to the text received on sept. 13/26

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.
15/28 septembre 1914, no. 294.

[...] Bratiano [...] autorise Diamandi à entamer un échange des notes et demande seulement l'addition de deux choses: [...] 2. que la frontière entre les parties russes et les parties roumaines de la Bucovine soit délimitée par le Prout, car cela fera une solide frontière entre les deux Etats et cela correspond aussi à la délimitation ethnographique dans cette région. [...]

(s) Poklevsky

Guzun 42, p. 166.

11. Brătianu's telegram to Diamandy with instructions on Romania's position in the ongoing negotiations to sign a military convention between Romania and Russia

Télégramme chiffré nr. 1104. Bucarest, le 15 / 28 septembre 1914, 11 à matin. T. C. de Bucarest expédié 15 sept. à I. nuit).

Ex[cellence] Diamandy, Ministre Roumanie Pétrograd.

Pour Bucovine il faut exiger frontière Pruth qui correspond aussi approximativement à la délimitation ethnographique. La garantie intégrale du territoire actuel est nécessaire.

(s) Bratiano

Legăția Română, nr. 18, *Diamandy ANR I 104.*

12. Diamandy transmits another draft of the text of a Romanian-Russian convention

P[e]t[ro]g[rad], le 15 / 28 septembre 1914. T. C. n. 1108.

Ex[cellence]Bratiano Présid[ent] Cons[eil] Buc[arest].

La Russie s'engage également à reconnaître à la Roumanie le droit d'annexer régions de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise habitées par les Roumains.

Pour Bucovine principe majorité de la population servira de base à la délimitation des territoires à annexer soit par Russie soit par la Roumanie. Cette délimitation sera effectuée à la suite études spéciales sur les lieux. Une Commission mixte sera nommée à cet effet munie d'instructions qui s'inspireront de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime les deux Gouvernements.

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 158, again 161–163.
Legăția Română, nr. 20, *Diamandy ANR I 105*.

13. Diamandy transmits more notes on the draft of the text of a Romanian-Russian convention

P[é]t[ro]g[rad], le 15 / 28 sep[tembre] 1914. T. C. N. 1109.

Ex[cellence] Bratiano, Président Conseil Bucarest.

Suite tél. ch. N. 1108. Voici ma note réponse:

„J'ai l'honneur accuser réception à V. E. de sa [Sazonov – n.a.] déclaration. En échange de cette déclaration, je suis autorisé par M. Bratiano, Président du Conseil de Roumanie de déclarer à V. E. que la Roumanie, de son côté, s'engage à observer jusqu'au jour où elle [va] occuper les régions de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise habitées par des Roumains – une neutralité bienveillante à l'égard de la Russie.”

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 156.
Legăția Română, nr. 19, *Diamandy ANR I 105*.

14. Diamandy continues to explain the ongoing Romanian-Russian negotiations

Pétrograd, le 15 septembre 1914 (expédié à 11 h. du soir). Télégr. Chiffré n° 1110.

Ex[cellence] Bratiano, Président Conseil Bucarest.

Suite explicative mon télégramme chiffré n° 1108 au sujet frontière Pruth Bucovine Sazonow m'a dit qu'il lui était impossible de prendre décision immédiate sans consulter militaires et base ethnographique. J'ai cru comprendre qu'il tenait à Czernowitz. Il a promis partage dans esprit large et conciliant ainsi que stipulé dans sa note.

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 164.
Legăția Română, nr. 21, *Diamandy ANR I 106*.

15. Telegram of Diamandy to Brătianu on the ongoing negotiations

P[é]t[ro]g[rad], 1 octobre 1914. T. C. no. 1203

Ex[cellence] Bratiano, Prés[ident] Conseil Bucarest.

Je réponds à votre tél. ch. d'aujourd'hui: [...] Sazonow, avant offre notre neutralité, m'a fait déclaration que territoires Monarchie habités roumains, restent lot Roumanie qui l'occuperait quant elle le voudrait.

(s) Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 27, f. 198.
Legăția Română, nr. 25, *Diamandy ANR I 125*.

16. Text of the Russian-Romanian convention as agreed by Sazonov and Diamandy

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.
20 septembre/3 octobre 1914, no. 3028

J'ai échangé avec l'ambassadeur de Roumanie des notes contenant les déclarations suivante : [...] 2. la Russie reconnaît le droit de la Roumanie d'annexer les provinces austro-hongroise dont la population est roumaine et cette délimitation sera établie dans la Bucovine par une commission spéciale et composée sur le principe de la majorité mathématique de telle ou telle population [...]

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky p. 179-180.

17. Iancu Flondor Memorandum on the Borders of Bukovina

It is only natural that on the basis of the principle of nationalities the relative majority of the population will decide the fate of the territory it inhabits. It is also incontestable that small portions – communes or villages – will not be taken into account, but only larger territory with natural borders as much as possible [...] As it has so far transpired in the public sphere as to the opinion of Russian deciding factors it seems to me that – with great pains – we will have to give up the part of Bukovina situated on the left side of the Pruth river. One must vigorously fight so that the rest of this country once broken from the bosom of Moldavia will be considered an integral part of our claims because it is certain that if it is now lost it will be a hard and irreparable blow [...] I admit that the West of Bukovina – the right side of the valley of the Ceremus river – is inhabited by a compact Ruthenian population; yet we have the right to claim this part as well as compensation for the Romanian population on the left bank of the Pruth river which numbers 10653 souls. The territory just mentions – “the Ruthenian mountains” starts from the Western Border towards the East up to a line which I define thus: [there follows a minute description of this line, n.a.]

East of this line population is mixed but increasingly more Romanian [towards the East].

In a worst-case scenario and as a *ultima ratio* it would be much more favourable to give up the “Ruthenian mountains” than the disputed territory [the area around Cernauti, n.a.]. [...]

[A map was annexed to the memorandum, which we present in **Fig. 6a-b.**]

February 1915

ANR SANIC, Personal file of Iancu Flondor, v. 15, 1–10.

Published in Andrei Popescu (ed.), *Iancu Flondor, Bucovina și Romania Mare*, București, 2017, doc. 24.

18. Poklevsky informs Sazonov on Diamandy's imminent departure to Russia

9/21 April 1915 – no. 234

Diamandy's instructions are to agree with you on the precise borders of future Romania [...]

These are the informations Diamandy has given me so far. It results from them that Brătianu wants to conclude with us a convention [of alliance, n.a.] based on our first

proposals to Romania, which included not only the occupation of Transylvania by Romania but also military cooperation and drawing a map, fixing exactly the future borders of the new conquests obtained by Romania.

(s) Poklevsky

Guzun 66, p. 199.

19. Brătianu telegraphs Diamandy with instructions on the ongoing negotiations to signed a convention of alliance between Romania and the Allied Powers.

Télégramme chiffré, no. 646 Reçu le 16/29 Avril 1915. à II heures. Urgent.

Excellence Diamandy à Petrograd.

[...] Take Ionescu et Filipescu m'ont promis leur concours pour Theiss et Pruth. No. 170 6h soir 15 Avril.

SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, f. 75

Diamandy ANR I 238

20. Brătianu sends instructions on an incoming map

Télégramme chiffré, no. 647 Reçu le 16/29 Avril 1915. à II heures. Urgent.

Excellence Diamandy à Petrograd.

Dans la carte que nous vous adressons du Major Sârbu il faut introduire modifications suivantes : De Seghedin frontière suivra cours Theiss vers Nord jusqu'à la hauteur du village Algyo, d'ici elle se dirige Nord-Est faisant une petite courbe à trois kilomètres Ouest du village Bekes-Samson d'où elle continue 25493 ligne direction N. jusque trois mille mètres O. de la confluence de Bes-Crisch, ensuite dans la direction du N. passant six K. à la droite de Debreczen et 25017 ant ainsi arrive à quatre mille mètres N. confluence Theiss avec Somes, alors laissant de notre cote village Vasaros-Nameny retrouve ancient 15560 que vous possédez a trois mille mètres du mont Ko-30081-la.

No. 170 6h soir 15 Avril.

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, f. 74

Diamandy ANR I 239.

21. Diamandy demands a new, updated map.

Urgent. Télégramme chiffré, no. 663 16/29 april. 1915

Excellence Brătianu, President Conseil, Bucarest.

Pour éviter toute erreur prie Votre Excellence m'envoyer d'urgence Carte précise avec délimitations nos revendications.

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, f. 73.

Diamandy ANR I 242.

22. Russian foreign affairs secretary Neratov writes to the Russian ambassador in Paris.

Télégramme secret du minister-adjoint aux Affaires Etrangères de Russie a l'ambassadeur à Paris, no. 1978.

[...] De mon cote je vous autorise à dire à Delcasse que si la Roumanie, délaissant le principe ethnique, insiste sur l'acquisition de presque toute la Bucovine au détriment des intérêts russes, et de tout le Banat à enlever aux Serbes, l'Entente va se heurter à des difficultés insurmontables. [...]

(s) Neratov

Polonsky p. 188 ; Guzun 68, p. 202.

23. Diamandy informs Brătianu on a meeting with the British ambassador.

18 April/1 May 1915 Cyphered telegram nr. 675

During the meeting he added that settling the question of Bukovina falls only to Russia. He finds our demands exaggerated. He always believed, like Sazonov, that they will be limited to Transylvania. The principle of nationalities must be respected and it was impossible for Serbia, displaying so much heroism, to leave its capital, Belgrade at the mercy of a third party.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 28, 28v.

Diamandy ANR II 15.

24. Diamandy asks for statistical data on Transylvania and Austro-Hungary

18 April/1 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 679

I ask you to emergently send me [...] statistical works in Hungarian, German on the Romanian population in Austro-Hungary as well as the book of Cheradamme on Austro-Hungary and other favourable documentations.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 30.

Diamandy ANR II 17.

25. Brătianu sends a new map with border corrections

18 April/1 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 682

I repeat here my telegram of 15/28 April and I add the requested map by mail. In the map you have you must add the following correction: from Szeged the frontier follows the course of the Tisza to the North [...]

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 31.

Diamandy ANR II 18.

26. Brătianu sends adjusted border in Ruthenia and hints to concessions

18 April/1 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 686

In regards to our future frontiers, starting from the joint of the Somesh with the Tisza until Bukovina, please replace your previous instructions with the demand of the basin of the

Tisza until the line of the separation of the rivers, that is until the border of Galicia. In this way I have presented to the minister of Russia our demands, allowing them to understand that in this region I am ready to make some concessions to the Ruthenians.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 35.

Diamandy ANR II 21.

27. Diamandy demands three maps besides the one sent before.

Urgent. Télégramme chiffré, no. 691. 19 April [2 mai]. 1915

Excellence Brătianu, President Conseil, Bucarest.

Prie V. Ex. vouloir bien m'envoyer urgence trois cartes avec délimitations nos revendications en autre celle déjà expédiée. Pour éviter toute erreur prie Votre Excellence m'envoyer d'urgence Carte précise avec délimitations nos revendications.

(s) Diamandy.

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, f. 78.

Diamandy ANR I 244.

28. Poklevsky reports on a possible compromise in Bukovina, the so called Costinescu line.

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.

19 avril/2 mai 1915, no. 277.

Kostinesco m'a fait part aujourd'hui du profond désenchantement qu'a éveillé en lui le refus du gouvernement russe de donner à la Roumanie Czernowitz, à laquelle la Roumanie est liée par son passé historique et national et qui est la résidence du métropolitain roumain. Selon l'avis de Kostinesco il faudrait pour être équitable faire passer la frontière de la Roumanie le long du Pruth et aussitôt après Czernowitz, laissant cette ville à la Roumanie, la faire suivre au sud-ouest en laissant à la Russie les populations d'origine russe qui vivent auprès de la frontière de Galicie. Ce que Kostinesco m'a dit n'est absolument que son opinion personnelle.

(s) Poklevsky

Polonsky p. 190. Guzun 78, p. 215 (although labeled no. 274 and dated 12th of May).

29. Diamandy reports on the 20th April /3rd May meeting with Sazonov in his memoirs

- a. [Cum s-a creat harta Romaniei Mari] At the meeting of May the 3rd, with Mr. Sazonov I had come with the map of our claims, but he, from the start, presented me with a map which, curious detail, dated from 1875 and in which the nationalities between the the Tisza and the Pruth, that is Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina, exactly the *territories* that had to be negotiated between us, were marked in colours and the dominant colour, at first sight, was green representing the Slavic element. I couldn't stop myself telling Mr. Sazonov: the map has a horrible appearance through the green colour and allow me to bring forth a more modern map than this one.

See above, footnote 14.

- b. From the start Romania was accused of intransigence and when, on the 3rd of May 1915 I was heading to Pont-aux Chantres and when, for the first time, I was presenting the claims of my country, I realized how many difficulties we will have in obtaining what we considered indispensable so as to ensure the ethnic unity of Romania. [...] The map I had in my hand and which I wanted to show Sazonov, I had not shown at my first meeting, then, as I have already related, he approached me in this way: "Now that Italy enters the war, the price for Romania [‘s entry into the war, n.a.] has dropped". I therefore withdrew [...] the map I had in my hand and I had a great surprise seeing the one he was showing me. For whatever reason, Mr. Sazonov used, on this occasion, an old atlas which dated from 1878 and in which most of Bukovina and more than 3/4th of the Banat were coloured in green, the colour of Slavic populations. I formulated our claims: in Bukovina the line of the Pruth and in the Banat the thalweg of the Danube and of the Tisza [natural frontier]. He cried out in protest saying that our claims were exaggerated. The meeting ended on a friendly tone but the two were on profound disagreement. [...] In what regards me, even from the moment I presented my claims and I sent Mr. Sazonov a map at the same time correct and without Slavic hachures, I withdrew in my shell [...]
- ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 130 6–9v.
- c. [La Délimitation Territoriale]. Je suis venu de Bucarest avec une grande carte contenant délimitations territoriales de la Roumanie pour la convention politique. À ma première entretenu avec Mr. Sazonov, je n’avais pas ma carte: en échange Sazonov m-a soumis une carte minuscule prise dans un atlas de 1859 et où la couleur verte qui marquait les éléments slaves en Bucovine Maramuresh et Banat était prépondérants et, ainsi que je le lui dis, bariolait la carte au point de faire mal à voir. Je lui promis d’apporter la mienne, qui était sur une plus grande échelle et où nos revendications étaient marquées au crayon bleu.
- ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 108, f. 1–5.

30. Sazonov reports on the meeting with Diamandy, 3rd of May 1915

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l’ambassadeur à Bucarest. 20 avril/3 mai 1915, no. 2040.

J’ai vu pour la première fois aujourd’hui Diamandi, qui m’a énumère les acquisitions territoriales que la Roumanie voudrait se voir garantir pour une entrée en guerre à nos côtés contre l’Autriche-Hongrie> la Bucovine jusqu’au Pruth, la Transylvanie, le Banat jusqu’à la Tisa, une part de la Hongrie jusqu’à Szegedin, au confluent de la Tisa e du Somes, et plus loin les Carpathes de la Bucovine. L’ai répondu que pareilles exigences n’étaient pas acceptables, car nous ne pouvons consentir ni à ce que la population russe de la Bucovine et de l’Ugorczina soit remise au pouvoir de la Roumanie, ni à ce que les Roumains s’approchent de Belgrade pour lequel ils peuvent devenir une menace aussi grande que la menace autrichienne. [...]

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky, p. 189. Guzun 72, p. 208.

31. Diamandy reports on the meeting with the French ambassador.

21 April/4 May 1915 Cyphered telegram nr. 706

[...] Délcassé as well lets it be understood that our claims are limited to Transylvania. He recommends Romania adopts moderation and conciliatory spirit [...]

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 40, 40v.

Diamandy ANR II 26.

32. Sazonov telegrams Poklevsky his answer to Romania's claims

22st April/5th May 1915, no. 2083

Under no circumstances can we accept the line of the Pruth. The frontier in Bukovina must be drawn, as we have convened in our 18th September convention [18.09/1.10 1914, see above no. 19], based on the ethnographic principle, admitting only smaller corrections in regards to reciprocal exchange of small areas, to draw the frontier better. Likewise, the Russian population of Transcarpathia cannot be given to Romania. [...]

(s) Sazonov

Guzun 75, p. 211.

33. Brătianu responds to the remarks of the British ambassador.

25 April/8 May 1915 Cyphered telegram nr. 731

Sir Edward Grey believes that our aspirations are limited to Transylvania, when, in reality, as you well know, it was always about Hungarian lands inhabited by Romanians [...] The day before yesterday I have sent you by mail the one and only map with the definitive shape of the demanded border.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 48 (2), 48 (2v).

Diamandy ANR II 32.

34. Diamandy reports on a meeting with Sazonov.

25 April/8 May 1915 Cyphered telegram nr. 734

[...] I replied that, if he wanted to call an ultimatum bargaining our national aspirations, he would be forced to admit that this is a friendly ultimatum. Russia, he continued, could not show a lack of interest in leaving Belgrade exposed or in abandoning the Ugro-Russians of Maramuresh or the Ruthenians of Bukovina. If we would take all of Banat, in a few years there would be a war with Serbia.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 50, 50(v).

Diamandy ANR II 33.

35. Diamandy demands bibliography supporting Romania's claims.

From the Legation in Petrograd. Nr. 754 28 april./11 mai 1915

Contzesco Externe Bucarest.

Je vous prie de m'envoyer l'ouvrage de Monsieur Aurel Morariu intitulé « Bucovine » et la meilleure histoire sur les roumains de la Transylvanie.

(s) Diamandy. No. 754.

AMAE 1914 E71 partea 2, vol. 33, f. 87 Unpublished.

36. Poklevsky proposes a compromise solution for the Banat.

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.
30 avril/13 mai 1915, no. 277⁵⁶.

[...] D'autre part, si nous laissons à la Serbie seulement le district de Pantchev, qui est contigu au Danube et peuple de Serbes, ou bien un tiers du district de Torontal, et si nous consentions à la frontière proposée par Kostinesco en Bucovine, alors la situation de Bratiano en deviendrait très difficile [...]

(s) Poklevsky

Polonsky p. 191.

37. Diamandy writes an Aide-Mémoire of a meeting with Sazonov on May the 14th.

Pétrograd, le 1 / 14 mai 1915. Aide-Mémoire.

Se conformant à ce principe qui fonde la répartition des territoires en question sur la majorité ethnique, le Gouvernement croit devoir esquisser la ligne suivante qui, en thèse générale et sauf quelques rectifications de détail, pourrait servir à indiquer les futures acquisitions de la Roumanie.

Partant de la frontière actuelle près de la localité de Botouchanitzza, cette ligne rejoindrait, un peu au nord au Gadac, la Suchava et remonterait ensuite le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à Schipot, d'où elle continuerait à peu près en ligne droite jusqu'à la frontière actuelle de la Transylvanie au sud de Borsa. Suivant de là cette frontière jusqu'à Guttin, la ligne de délimitation se dirigerait ensuite vers l'ouest en passant un peu [au] sud de Nad-Bania et, après avoir atteint le Samosz, irait (illisible) droit au Nord-Ouest sur Tisza-Ulak pour longer ensuite la Tisza jusqu'à Vasaros-Nameny. Depuis cette localité la future frontière Roumanie suivrait la ligne indiquée dans la notice que Mr. Diamandy a remise à Mr. Sazonow jusqu'à l'embouchure de la Maros dans la Tisza. De là elle devrait suivre la Maros à peu près jusqu'à Peska pour se diriger ensuite vers le Sud-Sud-Est en laissant Temeswar et Biela-Serkow à la Serbie et, après avoir rejoint le Danube près de Bazias continuerait en descendant ce fleuve jusqu'à la frontière actuelle de la Roumanie.

La ligne ainsi tracée englobe de vastes territoires comprenant toutes les régions où la population roumaine est en majorité et même en plus, certaines parties du pays habitées

⁵⁶ The publication gives the same telegram number for two documents.

surtout par d'autres nationalités que les Puissances sont cependant disposés à inclure dans la part qui doit revenir à la Roumanie pour donner à la frontière une meilleure configuration.

Mr. Sazonow aime à croire que, de son côté, le peuple Russe chez lui le sentiment national est si développé, comprendra que toute autre obligation morale pour la Russie et pour la Serbie de se réserver les territoires où leurs nationaux sont, à leur tour, en majorité, comme c'est le cas en Bucovine Septentrionale et dans le Banat Occidental.

[sans signature]

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 80–81.

Legea Română, nr. 54, *Diamandy ANR I* 246.

Same document is sent by Sazonov to Poklevsky, see Guzun 80, p. 217.

38. Sazonov instructs Poklevsky on the ongoing negotiations.

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest.

1/14 Mai 1915, no. 2235.

Le no. 2231 vous transmet le texte d'un mémorandum date d'aujourd'hui [see next item on our list, n.a.] [...] La délimitation que nous proposons laisse à la Roumanie non seulement toutes les provinces ou la majorité de la population est roumaine, mais beaucoup de provinces aussi qui sont peuplées presque entièrement de Hongrois, Serbes et même de Russes en partie. [...]

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky, p. 191–2, Guzun 81, p. 220.

39. Diamandy sends suggestions to the point of continuing negotiations.

2/15 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 792

[...] 1. In this agreement (i.e. the neutrality agreement of October 1914, n.a.) the principle of the ethnic majority does not exist, with one reserve, Bukovina, which is an ex-Romanian province. [...]

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 56, 57.

Diamandy ANR II 39.

40. Diamandy offers suggestions on continuing the negotiations

3/16 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 798

These proposals [i.e. the original Russian offers of July 1914, see no. 2 above, n.a.] speak of lands inhabited by Romanians without a single reference to Bukovina [...]. We could add [in our counterproposals, n.a.] the suggestion that the same Romanian territories or others which Russia concedes that should be occupied by Romania, according to the accord and in return for our neutrality [...]

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 60.

Diamandy ANR II 40.

41. Diamandy demands more bibliography supporting Romania's claims.

De la Legatiunea din Petrograd. Nr. 797. 3/16 mai 1915

Contzesco Externe Bucarest.

Suite à mon télégramme no. 754. Je vous prie de m'envoyer aussi livre Cheradame sur l'Autriche-Hongrie.

(s) Diamandy. No. 797.

AMAE 1914 E71 partea 2, vol. 33, f. 88. Unpublished.

42. Poklevsky reports on Brătianu's reaction to Russian offer

5/18 May 1915, nr. 286.

[...] during a long, friendly talk, Brătianu stated the following.

The border we propose leaves out almost half of the ancient historic Romanian province of Bukovina...

Brătianu stated that in these conditions he will report to the king that he cannot assume responsibility to immediately declare war on Austro-Hungary and that he supposes that he would, with time, occupy those Austro-Hungarian provinces with a Romanian population, just as Romania was told it could do in our agreement from September last year [...]

(s) Poklevsky

Guzun 82, p. 222.

43. Diamandy asks for more bibliography supporting Romania's claims.

De la Legatiunea din Petrograd. Nr. 869. 7/20 mai 1915

Contzesco Externe Bucarest.

Suite à mes télégrammes chiffres n°. 754 et 797. Je vous prie de m'envoyer d'urgence l'histoire des Roumains d'Autriche-Hongrie par Monsieur Iorga, le livre de Monsieur Cheradame sur l'Autriche-Hongrie et les conférences ainsi que les publications des meilleures sur les Roumains d'Autriche-Hongrie.

(s) Diamandy. No. 869.

AMAE 1914 E71 partea 2, vol. 33, f. 89, unpublished.

44. Diamandy reports on a meeting with the British ambassador

11/24 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 859

[...] We already had the agreement with Russia (the neutrality agreement of October 1914, n.a.) ; all we did was to present the map which illustrated the text.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 73, 73v.

Diamandy ANR II 49.

45. Brătianu sends new instructions on the demanded border

12/25 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 860

Do not forget to show that Serbia crossing the Danube does not match the ethnic importance [of Serbs North of the Danube, n.a.] and would cause wars in the future.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 75, 75v.

Diamandy ANR II 50.

46. Diamandy asks for clarification as to which map he should use.

12/25 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 861

[...] for more clarification please telegraph whether in Maramureș we fall back to the old map I brought with me from Bucharest.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 76

Diamandy ANR II 51.

47. Diamandy reports on a meeting with Sazonov.

12/25 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 863

Regarding the Banat, Sazonov told me he could not abandon the Serbs and showed me, on an ethnographic map a demarcation line which left the Serbs most of the Torontal district.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 77, 77v.

Diamandy ANR II 52.

48. Diamandy reports on Sazonov's ethnographic map

13/26 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 866

The ethnographic map shown to me by Sazonov and about which he says it is the Hungarian official one bears the date of 1878. It is on this map that he based his argumentation and on which he obtained the approval of the Allies.

It would be opportune to signal to Paris and London and for all of us to procure the most advantageous Romanian and Hungarian ethnographic maps. Please urgently send the map and books I have requested in my cyphered telegram nr. 679 [see above no. 24].

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 81.

Diamandy ANR II 54.

49. Brătianu sends bibliography justifying Romania's territorial claims

Le 15 / 28 mai 1915.

Monsieur le Ministre, Vous trouverez ci-joint les arguments politiques et historiques de nos revendications. Ces derniers nous ont été par M. Iorga – comme leur travail a été fait à la hâte il y a certaines parties qu'il vaut mieux ne pas faire connaître. Le Président du Conseil

vous les envoie plutôt pour que vous eut puissiez ce que vous trouverez nécessaire. Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

C. Bratiano

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 84–84 v.

Legea Română, nr. 56, *Diamandy ANR I 249*.

50. Brătianu sends instructions regarding the ethnographic map.

17/30 May 1915. Cyphered telegram nr. 904

In the ethnographic map of the Banat please suppress the margins containing useless numbers.

ANR SANIC, *Colecția 50*, dosar 5918, f. 92.

Diamandy ANR II 62.

51. The unsigned memorandum on the Banat found in the Diamandy file concerning the Banat

Le Banat n'est qu'une partie du territoire ethnique roumain, habité par une population incontestablement aborigène, que les rois de Hongrie ayant à résister aux attaques des empereurs byzantins, fortifiés dans le duché de Belgrade et Branitschero, détachèrent sous des bans ou capitaines de frontière, pour en faire une marche, à une époque qui doit être le onzième et le douzième siècle. [...]

Le caractère purement roumain de cette région, un des anciens centres des Daces, ancêtres de la race, est attesté dès le Ve siècle par le récit du chroniqueur byzantin Priscus, qui mentionne même les termes d'origine latine dont se servaient les habitants [...]

La vie politique des Serbes prit naissance sur les rivages de l'Adriatique....Ce n'est que bien tard, surtout après la catastrophe de Cossovo (1389) qu'elle se groupa en se retirant vers le Danube pour chercher un dernier abris. Belgrade le même fut, après cette époque aussi une forteresse avancée des Hongrois [...] Le grand ouvrage de Jirecek n'a pas une seule page concernant les Serbes du Banat jusqu'à la mort du Tzar Douchane [...]

Pour montrer l'infériorité absolue de l'élément Serbe dans le Banat, nous citerons le témoignage non suspect de Grisellini, qui employait, vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle, des sources officielles, dans sa célèbre „Geschichte du Temesvarer Banats. (Vienne 1780). 181.639 Roumains et seulement 78.780 Serbes sur une population totale de 317.928 (p. 196).

Et il n'y a pas de village Serbe, de bourg au caractère plutôt Serbe, ou une minorité roumaine ne s'affirme et ne gagne du terrain, grâce à ses efforts aussi bien qu'à la conscience que les droits historiques sont de son côté [...]

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 109. Unpublished.

52. Diamandy suggests a compromise on Bukovina and Maramures

19 mai / 1 juin 1915. Télégramme chiffré enregistré sous No. 920.

Excellence Bratiano, Bucarest.

Entretien que je viens, d'avoir avec l'Ambassadeur Angleterre m'a laissé l'impression que si nous cédions sur question Banat, laquelle Triple Entente s'est engagée et

Sir Edw. Grey ne démord pas, il y aurait peut-être moyen s'accorder sur Bucovine et Maramouesch par concession que ferait Russie.

signé: Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 85.

Legăția Română, nr. 57, *Diamandy ANR I 251*.

53. Diamandy reports on negotiations and suggests compromise solution on Bukovina

Pétrograd, le 21 mai / 3 juin 1915. T. C. No. 942.

Il [i.e. Sazonov, n.a.] m'a laissé ensuite entendre qu'on pourrait trouver accommodement au Maramouesch. J'ai insisté sur Pruth et Banat. J'ai rencontré résistance. J'ai fait appel à ses vues larges en le mettant amicalement en garde contre personnages influents qui nous sont hostiles ici; j'ai laissé entendre Grand Duc Nicolas, Princesse lointaine Monténégrine, et Etat-Major. Il m'a affirmé que ces influences n'avaient pas de prise à Tzarskoe-Selo.

J'ai impression que pour arrangement final il faudra examiner si comme ultimatum et maximum concession en Bucovine ligne partant du Pruth qui nous resterait, suivant séparation des eaux et allant Iablontza, portion qui est peuplée Ruthènes.

ss Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 88–88v.

Legăția Română, nr. 59, *Diamandy ANR I 253*.

54. Sazonov comments on the ongoing negotiations between Romania and Russia

Pétrograd, le 21 mai / 3 juin 1915. À la Légation de Roumanie. Aide-Mémoire.

Pour ce qui concerne les territoires que la Roumanie pourrait obtenir si elle entrait en guerre, sans délai contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, Monsieur Sazonow a le regret de constater que le Gouvernement Roumain ne fait pas suffisamment droit au principe des nationalités que, par ailleurs, il invoque lui-même pour justifier ses aspirations. À ce point de vue l'abandon par la Roumanie de ses revendications pour ce qui touche la région de la haute Tisza ne peut résoudre la question, car, en dehors de cette région forte limitée, le Gouvernement Roumain continue à réclamer de vastes territoires habités par une incontestable majorité Russe ou Serbe.

Désirant cependant donner une preuve de ses dispositions conciliantes, bien qu'il n'ait pas encore reçu du Gouvernement Roumain une réponse à son aide-mémoire du 1-er Mai, le Gouvernement Impérial serait, pour sa part, prêt à apporter quelques amendements à la ligne-frontière tracée dans cet aide-mémoire, notamment pour ce qui concerne la partie Nord-Est du Comitat de Torontal ainsi que la Bucovine, où la ligne du Seret pourrait, à la rigueur, être substituée à celle de la Suchava, mais il faudrait pour cela que le Gouvernement Roumain, de son côté, se montrât réellement animé du désir d'aboutir à un accord sur une base équitable en tenant compte des devoirs que la Russie et la Serbie ont chacune vis-à-vis de leurs nationaux respectifs.

[sans signature]

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 89–89v.

Legăția Română, nr. 60, *Diamandy ANR I 254*.

55. Diamandy comments on the ongoing negotiations and proposes a compromise solution

Télégramme chiffré 960. 24 mai / 6 juin 1915, dans l'après-midi.

Excellence Bratiano, Président Conseil Bucarest.

[...] Si Russie a intérêt Bucovine cause Ruthènes et territoriale, il est caractère plutôt local. Par contre Banat entre dans calculs politiques Triple Entente baser politique balkanique sur entente Serbo-Bulgare par concession dont Banat serait appoint. [...]

Il y a lieu de considérer qu'il n'y aurait pas avantage pour nous annexer toute la Bucovine, ni même tout Maramouesch englobant éléments slaves que Russie a convoité et auxquels elle pourrait continuer à s'intéresser.

...

signé: Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 94–94v.

Legăția Română, nr. 65, *Diamandy ANR I 258*.

56. Brătianu sends Diamandy bibliography and an answer to Sazonov's comments (no. 54 above)

Télégramme chiffré 1009. Bucarest, le 30 mai / 12 juin 1915, 9 h. 25, nuit.

Excellence Diamandy, Pétrograd.

Je vous envoie aujourd'hui, par la poste, réponse à l'Aide-Mémoire Russe dans lequel nous maintenons, sous forme amicale, les points essentiels de nos revendications.

Avant de le remettre, je vous autorise à me proposer, télégraphiquement, les modifications que vous jugez opportunes.

signé: Bratiano

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 101.

Legăția Română, nr. 71, *Diamandy ANR I 261*.

57. Brătianu sends Diamandy Serbian bibliography on the Banat

Télégramme chiffré 1012. Pétrograd, le 30 mai / 12 juin 1915, 6 heures 12 soir.

Excellence Diamandy, Petrograd.

Je vous ai fait expédier, par la poste, dix exemplaires d'un Mémoire que les Serbes ont répandu sur la Question du Banat, ainsi que sa réfutation, point de vue roumain, fait par une personne connaissant à fond la question.

Veillez utiliser à bon escient cette publication, dans laquelle à vous de puiser abondamment arguments pouvant servir notre cause.

signé: Bratiano No. 266

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 99.

Legăția Română, nr. 69, *Diamandy ANR I 263*.

58. Brătianu sends Diamandy instructions

Pétrograd, le 30 mai / 13 juin 1915. T. C. 1010

Excellence Diamandy, Pétrograd.

[...] Cette démarche de Poklewsky m'a donné l'impression que l'entrée en matière immédiate pourra entraîner accord complet, donc Danube, Theiss et Pruth.

signé: Bratiano

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 100–100v.

Legăția Română, nr. 70, *Diamandy ANR I 262*.

59. Diamandy reports on the latest negotiations and proposes the Costinescu line in Bukovina

Pétrograd, le 4 / 17 juin 1915, soir. T. C. No. 1054.

Ex[cellence] Bratiano, Président Conseil B[u]C[a]R[est].

Sazonow m'a dit que question Banat empêchait accord; pour Bucovine il était disposé à faire concession nous concédant Pruth et Cernovitz, en adoptant la ligne Costinescu, qui laisserait à la Russie la portion ouest entre montagnes Ruthènes et Ceremus. Nous vous abandonnerions 30 000 Ruthènes orthodoxes. Il a ajouté en passant: nous vous demanderions de ne pas les priver d'écoles et les dénationaliser.

signé: Diamandy

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 107–107v.

Legăția Română, nr. 77, *Diamandy ANR I 268*.

60. Sazonov telegraphs Poklewsky Russia's decision to compromise on Bukovina.

Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucarest. 17/30 mai 1915, no. 3102.

La Russie a décidé pour s'adjoindre la Roumanie à satisfaire à toutes les exigences des Roumains en Bucovine [...] Bratiano consent à son tour à certaines concessions dans l'Ugorczina [i.e. Maramuresh, n.a.] mais continue à insister sur l'annexion de tout le Banat [...]

(s) Sazonov

Polonsky, p. 198.

61. Poklewsky proposes a compromise solution for the Banat and Bukovina, based on the Costinescu line

Secret telegram of the ambassador in Bucharest to the Foreign minister. 5/18 June 1915, no. 399.

[...] We [Poklevsky with the Italian and the French ambassadors, n.a.] also believe that we must accept the Costinescu line in Bukovina and to leave the Serbs only a few tens of square kilometers in the Banat North of the Danube and in the Torontal. Regarding the latter, perhaps it would be better to let Romania and Serbia submit this border to arbitration [...]

(s) Poklevsky

Guzun 88, p. 231.

62. Brătianu sends Diamandy instructions

Sent 11/24 June 1915; 1a.m.; received at 9 am T. C. 1094

Excellence Diamandy, Pétrograd.

Poklevsky has just told me that Russia agrees to give up Bukovina up to the Pruth, that it requires Tisza as a border for all of Maramures but that it cannot take away South-Western Banat to the Serbs. I thanked him for Bukovina, I accepted Tisza for Maramuresh but I maintained the Danube as a frontier of the Banat, declaring that I am giving him no hope [...]

(s) Brătianu

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 130.

Diamandy ANR I 279.

63. Brătianu sends Diamandy instructions

Sent 13/26 June 1915; 12.30 a.m.; received at 8.30 am T. C. 1094

Excellence Diamandy, Pétrograd.

Urgent. Here is the answer I gave today to the request the Russian ambassador made the day before yesterday: As I said, I have been happy to find out the Imperial Government is willing to accept the Pruth through all its track in Bukovina, as the future frontier with Romania. If agreement is reached in other points I am willing to reduce our claims to the thalweg of the Tisza in Northern Hungary, from its sources. To rectify the breach Galicia forms between Romania's possessions [between Maramures and Bukovina, - n.a.], I hope the Russian government will agree that the Southern part of that bulge, almost devoid of population, be annexed by Romania. [...]

(s) Brătianu

ANR SANIC, Fond personal „C. Diamandy”, dosar 30, vol. I, f. 135, 135v, 136.

Diamandy ANR I 283.

64. Sazonov accepts all of Brătianu's demands

27 June/10 July 1915, no. 3303

In agreement with France and Britain it has been decided to satisfy all of Brătianu's demands, that is: to give up all of Bukovina up to the Pruth, Transcarpathia to the Tisza and the entire Banat [...]

(s) Sazonov

Guzun 98, p. 245.

65. Russian Foreign Minister Stürmer telegraphs his ambassadors in London and Paris

31 July/13 August 1916

At the same time the Imperial Government is certain that the great concessions and sacrifices it has made for the general success [of the war, n.a.] will be dealt with the appropriate attention and that would the need arise in the future to interpret certain pacts, which are not clear enough in the convention, the Allied governments will not hesitate to support Russia's point of view.

(s) Stürmer

Polonsky no. 3513, p. 209. Direcția generală a Arhivelor Statului, *1918 la români. Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Documente externe, 1879–1916*, vol. 1, București, 1983, p. 756, no. 232.

66. Alliance Treaty signed between Romania and the Allied Powers

August 4/17, Bucharest

Article III

La France, la Grande Bretagne, l'Italie et la Russie reconnaissent à la Roumanie le droit d'annexer les territoires de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise stipules et délimites à l'article IV.

Article IV

[...] Les limites des territoires mentionnés à l'article précédent sont fixées comme suit: [...] [there follows a long list of geographical markers, n.a.]

